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 1 
A INTRODUCTION 
The issue considered in this paper proceeds from the basis of a hypothetical income tax 
assessment issued by SARS against a hypothetical taxpayer. 
The circumstances under which the hypothetical assessment is raised are as follows: suppose 
that Company A, a South African resident, owns 100% of the participation rights in Company 
B (the hypothetical taxpayer), a resident of Luxembourg. Company A has failed to qualify for 
any of the internal “exemptions”1 contained in section 9D of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 
(“the Act”), and has thus been taxed with reference to the profits of Company B for the past 
ten years. 
In the eleventh year, SARS audits Company B and determines that its effective place of 
management has, in fact, been in South Africa all along and that it is therefore resident in South 
Africa in terms of paragraph (b) of the definition of “resident” contained in section 1 of the 
Act. 
Upon the determination that Company B is resident in South Africa, SARS proceeds to raise 
assessments against Company B in relation to the taxable income it earned during its current 
and former years of assessment (i.e. income tax assessments are raised for the full 11-year audit 
period) (referred to herein below as the “hypothetical assessment”).  
The purpose of this paper is thus to investigate the fiscal consequences that do (and, it will be 
argued, do not) arise subsequent to a controlled foreign company (“CFC”) having been 
declared resident of the Republic of South Africa, in circumstances where a South African 
resident taxpayer had historically been taxed with reference to the profits of that CFC in terms 
of section 9D. 
It is clear from the example that the same income now being taxed in the hands of Company B 
subsequent to its South African residency would already have been taxed in the hands of 
Company A by application of section 9D. The inequity of this result is undeniable. Should 
 
1 In other words, none of the provisions contained in section 9D which serve to exclude the taxing provision thereof have been satisfied. 
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assessments be raised against Company B in the manner suggested it would amount to 
economic double taxation.  
This paper seeks to argue that it would not be competent for SARS to raise assessments against 
a “newly resident” taxpayer in the circumstances described above. The argument against the 
competency of such assessments is threefold: 
i. Firstly, I deal with the question as to what constitutes an “assessment” and demonstrate, 
with reference to case law, that an assessment amounts to a decision taken by SARS to 
tax certain income, and is not therefor something confined to the piece of paper on 
which that decision to tax may be communicated. On this basis it will be argued that, 
as SARS had already taken a decision to tax the income referred to in the example 
above in the hands of the South African resident taxpayer on strength of section 9D, it 
will be precluded from assessing the same income later in the hands of the hypothetical, 
newly resident taxpayer (which had previously been the CFC in relation to which 
section 9D was applied), as to do so would amount to economic double taxation; 
 
ii. Secondly, I will attempt to develop the principle dealt with under the first argument 
with reference to the judgment of Corbett JA, as he then was, in the case of 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Louw.2 In Louw it was held that where SARS elects 
to invoke the anti-avoidance provisions of section 103 of the Act and raise assessments 
in the hands of an individual taxpayer in circumstances where the income in question 
had already been taxed in the hands of a corporate taxpayer “equity demands” that 
SARS should, in applying section 103, either make an allowance for the tax already 
paid by the corporate taxpayer or re-open the corporate taxpayer’s assessments and 
make a fitting adjustment; 
 
iii. Thirdly, I will investigate the meaning of the concept of “place of effective 
management” as a test for tax residency and attempt to demonstrate that SARS’ 
understanding of the concept, as articulated in its Interpretation Notes on the topic, has 
undergone a volte face change from the first issue of the Interpretation Note to the 
second. On this basis it will be argued that any non-resident entities who were not drawn 
 
2 1983 (3) SA 551 (A). 
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into South African tax residency on the basis of their place of effective management 
during the term of validity of the first issue of SARS Interpretation Note 6, will be able 
to resist attempts by SARS to do so now on the basis of a “practice generally prevailing” 
argument as contemplated in section 99(d)(i) of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011 
(“the Tax Administration Act”). 
Before turning to discuss the arguments outlined above I deal first, by way of background, with 
section 9D of the Act and briefly consider its provenance, purpose and application. 
B A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TAXING CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANIES 
The concept of taxing controlled foreign companies accompanied the advent of residence-
based taxation in South Africa.3 This change brought with it the imperative to tax “South 
African owned foreign companies” as it was clear that South African tax residents would 
otherwise be able to avoid or defer liability by shifting their profits to foreign entities, which 
profits would then only be susceptible to South African taxation once repatriated as 
distributions.4 The taxing scope of the section does not, however, extend to a controlled foreign 
company which conducts a so-called “foreign business establishment” (i.e. one that earns 
active income through its own operations as opposed to a passive entity which merely receives 
South African profits).5 
Section 9D of the Act was thus conceived as an anti-avoidance mechanism designed to prevent 
the deferral or avoidance of tax via South African owned foreign companies. It provides for 
the assessment to tax of South African residents on the basis of the profits earned by their 
 
3 Section 9D was first inserted into the Act in 1998 when South Africa’s system changed to a ‘source-plus’ system which extended the 
reach of the fiscus to tax foreign sourced passive income. Section 9D in its present form and complexity, however, was introduced when 
South Africa’s system was changed to be residency based. The change to the tax system was introduced by way of the Revenue Laws 
amendment Act, 59 of 2000 and was effective from 2001.See National Treasury’s contemporaneous detailed explanation to section 9D of 
the Act which can be accessed at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/tfsie/tax/legislation/Detailed%20Explanation%20to%20Section%209D%20of%20the%20Income%20
Tax%20Act.pdf referred to hereinafter as “The Treasury Explanation” (last accessed 15 June 2017).  
4 The Treasury Explanation page 1.  
5 Section 9D(9)(b) of the Act. 
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foreign owned companies (as though earned by the South African resident itself), which profits 
would then attract no liability for South African tax when actually repatriated.6  
Conceptually it was important that the implementation of section 9D did not amount to a form 
of “treaty override” and it is for this purpose that the profits of the CFC fell to be taxed in the 
hands of the South African resident as opposed to the foreign resident itself. The rationale being 
that, in this way, the same resident would not be taxed twice in contravention of the provisions 
of any treaty that might be in place.7 
It bears mention that, from inception, Treasury appreciated the fact that the assessment to tax 
of a resident on foreign profits would result in economic double taxation in the absence of relief 
in the form of foreign tax credits.8 
There are various provisions contained in section 9D which serve to exclude the operation of 
the taxing provisions thereof under narrowly defined circumstances, which may result in a 
taxpayer falling in and out of the purview of the section from year to year.  
Section 9D of the Act is a complex legislative provision and a detailed exposition thereof is 
unnecessary for present purposes as the premise of this paper proceeds on the most simplistic 
application thereof, namely, that a South African resident is taxed with reference to the profits 
of a controlled foreign company.  
The next section contains the first argument against the competency of issuing the hypothetical 
assessment and is concerned with the concept of assessment. 
C THE FIRST ARGUMENT: WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ASSESSMENT? 
The word “assessment” is defined in section 1 of the Tax Administration Act as follows: 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 The Treasury Explanation page 2. 
8 Ibid.  
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“assessment” means the determination of the amount of a tax liability or refund, 
by way of self-assessment by the taxpayer or assessment by SARS. 
Chapter 8 of the Tax Administration Act establishes the different types of assessments that can 
be raised, how such assessments must be raised, recorded or withdrawn as well as matters 
related thereto. 
Provision is made for original assessments,9 additional assessments,10 reduced assessments,11 
jeopardy assessments12 and estimated assessments.13 Section 100 of the Tax Administration 
Act describes the process in terms of which assessments become final with reference to any 
objections or appeals14 that may be raised by the taxpayer. 
In essence section 100 provides for three circumstances under which an assessment becomes 
final: first, where no objection has been received thereto or where an objection has been 
withdrawn, second, where no notice of appeal is filed pursuant to a decision being made on an 
objection and, third, where a dispute has been settled or where an appeal has been determined 
by the tax board, the tax court or any higher court and there is no right to further appeal.  
Chapter 8 of the Tax Administration Act also specifies the period of limitations for the issuance 
of assessments, this section is dealt with separately below. 
What is relevant for the present inquiry is the question as to what actually constitutes an 
assessment; is it the notice of assessment itself or the determination made by SARS which that 
notice reflects? To answer this question regard must be had to the meaning that has been 
attributed to the concept of an assessment by the courts.  
 
9 Section 91 of the Tax Administration Act. 
10 Section 92 of the Tax Administration Act. 
11 Section 93 of the Tax Administration Act. 
12 Section 94 of the Tax Administration Act. 
13 Section 95 of the Tax Administration Act.  
14 Chapter 9 of the Tax Administration Act – Dispute Resolution.  
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C 1 –  COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE v 
BRUMMERIA RENAISSANCE (PTY) LTD & OTHERS 
(“BRUMMERIA”)15 
During the relevant years of assessment the respondent companies were property developers 
who developed retirement villages. The respondents concluded contracts with prospective 
occupants of units still to be built.16  
These contracts were to the effect that the prospective occupants granted interest-free loans to 
the respondents, which loans were applied to finance the construction of particular units in the 
retirement village. To evidence the loan, the prospective occupants were issued with 
debentures, the title deeds of the relevant units were endorsed accordingly and covering bonds 
were registered over the units to secure the debt.17 
The prospective occupants did not take transfer of ownership of the units but were instead 
granted lifelong occupation thereof while ownership remained vested in the respondents. It was 
a term of the contracts that the respondents would repay the loans so extended upon 
cancellation of the agreements or upon the occupant’s death.18 
The contracts thus provided that the interest-free loans advanced to the respondents constituted 
the consideration in return for which lifelong occupation was granted. 
SARS issued assessments against the respondents and, pursuant to objections, issued revised 
assessments and, subsequently, further revised assessments. In terms of the further revised 
assessments SARS assessed the respondents to income tax on amounts equal to the value of 
their rights to utilise the interest-free loans.19  
 
15 2007 (6) SA 601 (SCA). 
16 Brummeria at [2] – [3]. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Brummeria at [5]. 
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An appeal to the tax court by the respondents having been upheld, SARS brought a further 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. In the SCA, the first respondent retained its argument 
that the interest-free loans did not amount to taxable receipts in its hands, but also argued that 
SARS was precluded from raising revised assessments on the basis that the period of 
limitations for doing so had prescribed.20  
More specifically, the first respondent submitted that SARS had changed the basis of its 
assessment in issuing the first revised assessment in response to the respondent’s objection, 
thereby fully allowing that objection. The further revised assessments amounted to a setting 
aside of the first revised assessments and a reinstatement of the original assessment and, 
because three years had passed since those original assessments were raised, they had become 
final which precluded SARS from reinstating them by way of further revised assessments.21 
SARS on the other hand argued that it was entitled to issue further revised assessments by 
virtue of the fact that the respondents had filed objections, thereby allowing SARS to alter the 
assessments under objection. Moreover, it was submitted that the three-year prescription period 
ran from the date of the first revised assessments and not from the date of the original 
assessments, that on this basis three years had not passed and that it was thus competent for 
SARS to issue further revised assessments.22 
Cloete JA, writing for a unanimous court, held that the mutually exclusive arguments raised by 
the parties in relation to the assessments and whether or not they had prescribed had to be 
resolved with reference to the purpose which underlined the legislative provisions relating to 
the period of limitations and the objection and appeal procedure.23  
Having confirmed that the purpose of the provisions in question was to achieve finality, the 
Court concluded that to uphold SARS’ argument would be to subvert that purpose. The 
provisions that provided for the period of limitations and the objection and appeal procedure 
 
20 At the time the period of limitations section was located in section 79 of the Act, it is now section 99 of the Tax Administration Act but 
its provisions remain analogous.  
21 Brummeria at [24]. 
22 Brummeria at [25]. 
23 Brummeria at [26]. 
 8 
entailed a balancing exercise of the public interest in the collection of taxes, on the one hand, 
and the public interest that disputes should come to an end on the other.24  
In the judgment of the Court, an honest taxpayer would suffer undue prejudice should SARS 
be allowed to constantly change the basis on which it assessed the taxpayer until it was satisfied 
that it had raised the correct assessment. Cloete JA held that it was for this very reason that 
Parliament had given SARS a period of three years within which to collect taxes, thereby 
achieving a balance between the imperative to collect revenue and the taxpayer’s interests in 
reaching finality with regard to the quantum of tax liability due. Even after the expiration of 
three years SARS was still able to re-open assessments if the taxpayer was guilty of fraud, 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure and dishonest taxpayers were thus afforded no 
protection.25  
Cloete JA thus determined that an acceptance of SARS’ argument would result in a disruption 
of the reasoned balance contemplated by the Legislature and would result in iniquitous 
consequences for the honest taxpayer.26 
Importantly, the Court held that once SARS had changed the entire basis on which it sought to 
assess the taxpayer in response to the latter’s objection, such assessment became final in the 
absence of fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure on the part of the taxpayer. In the words 
of the Court “that was the end of the matter”.27 
The decision in Brummeria illustrates that an assessment is a concept that transcends the paper 
on which it is reflected. To determine what constitutes a particular assessment one needs to 
have regard to the determination made by SARS in relation to the specified income which 
forms the subject matter of that assessment. 
Once SARS had satisfied itself of the merit in the respondent’s objection and changed the basis 
of the assessment, that assessment became final in the absence of taxpayer dishonesty. In 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Brummeria at [27]. 
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arriving at this conclusion, the Court was not beholden to the superficial aspects of the process 
of issuing assessments, but looked instead to what may be described as SARS’ decision-making 
process. Once a decision had been made SARS was bound by it in circumstances where the 
period of limitations within which it could have interfered had elapsed.  
This principle was confirmed in even clearer terms in the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in First South African Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service to which I now turn.  
C 2 – FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD v COMMISSIONER FOR 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE (“FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN 
HOLDINGS”)28 
First South African Holdings (Pty) Ltd, the taxpayer, brought an application in the High Court 
to set aside a decision made by SARS to the effect that the latter was precluded from 
entertaining the taxpayer’s request that a reduced income tax assessment be issued in relation 
to its 2002 year of assessment.29 
The setting aside application was brought after the taxpayer had submitted an income tax return 
in relation to its 2002 year of assessment which disclosed a taxable income of R15 892 978. In 
terms of this return the taxpayer sought to set off from its taxable income an amount of R34 
978 418 being an assessed loss carried forward from the preceding tax year. Consequently, by 
its calculations, the taxpayer suffered a tax loss of R19 085 440 during the 2002 year of 
assessment.30 
The taxpayer had, however, inadvertently omitted to take into account the fact that certain 
foreign exchange gains included in its taxable income were not fully taxable and had thus 
overstated its taxable income. SARS, being similarly unaware of this error, did not take issue 
with the taxpayer’s 2002 return and assessed the taxpayer to tax thereon on 17 July 2003. In 
 
28 2011 JDR 0449 (SCA).  
29 First South African Holdings at [1].  
30 First South African Holdings at [2]. 
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doing so SARS allowed the carrying over of the assessed loss claimed and no tax liability thus 
arose in respect of the taxpayer’s 2002 tax year.31  
On 12 April 2006, however, SARS issued an additional assessment pertaining to the taxpayer’s 
2002 year of assessment in terms of which it disallowed the assessed loss. SARS was entitled 
to issue the said additional assessment on account of the fact that the three-year limitation 
period had commenced running on17 July 2003 and had thus not yet elapsed. In the event, the 
taxpayer’s entire taxable income for 2002 (amounting to R15 892 978) became payable.32  
In issuing the additional assessment as aforesaid SARS did not reassess the taxpayer’s income 
but merely the set-off of the assessed loss that had been carried over from the 2001 year of 
assessment.33 The taxpayer appealed against SARS’ decision to disallow the assessed loss but 
the matter was settled and the taxpayer thus withdrew its appeal relating to that assessment. 
Then on 24 July 2007 the taxpayer addressed a letter to SARS. The taxpayer had by this time 
become aware of the error it had made in overstating its 2002 taxable income and therefore 
applied to SARS for a reduced assessment.34 
In substantiation of its motion to set aside SARS’ decision not to entertain its application for a 
reduced assessment, the taxpayer argued as follows: (i) the 2006 additional assessment was 
based on information submitted by the taxpayer in relation to its 2002 year of assessment, (ii) 
it was common cause that the taxpayer had overstated its taxable income in relation to its 2002 
year of assessment, (iii) its tax liability had thus been determined with reference to an incorrect 
amount of taxable income, (iv) SARS should have recognised that it had a discretion to reduce 
the assessment, and (v) SARS was therefore wrong to assume that it was not entitled to consider 
the taxpayer’s application for a reduced assessment.35 
 
31 First South African Holdings at [4]. 
32 First South African Holdings at [5]. 
33 Ibid.   
34 First South African Holdings at [7]. 
35 First South African Holdings at [8]. 
 11 
Having dismissed a point in limine brought by SARS regarding the application of the section 
dealing with reduced assessments to the 2002 tax year Harms DP, writing for a unanimous 
court, proceeded to consider whether a redetermination of the taxpayer’s taxable income had 
become time barred by virtue of the three-year period of limitations.36 
The Court held that this question depended on whether the prescription period began to run on 
the date of original assessment (i.e. 17 July 2003) or whether it only started to run from the 
date of the additional assessment (i.e. 12 April 2006).37 
According to Harms DP the date of the error which resulted in the overstatement of the 
taxpayer’s 2002 taxable income was irrelevant. The question as to when prescription began to 
run was dependent on whether the word “assessment” in the period of limitations provision 
was a reference to the notice of assessment, in which case the 2006 date on which the additional 
assessment was issued would be the relevant one.38  
However, Harms DP held that an “assessment” was not a notice of assessment. Instead, the 
learned judge concluded that an assessment was a ‘determination’ by SARS of one or more 
matters as was apparent from the definition of ‘assessment’ in section 1 of the Act, which at 
the relevant time, read as follows:39 
“assessment” means the determination by the Commissioner, by way of a notice 
of assessment (including a notice of assessment in electronic form) served in a 
manner contemplated in section 106(2) –  
(a) of an amount upon which any tax leviable under this Act is chargeable; 
or 
(b) of the amount of any such tax; or 
(c) of any loss ranking for set-off; or 
 
36 First South African Holdings at [15]. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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(d) of any assessed capital loss determined in terms of paragraph 9 of the 
Eighth Schedule…40 
Harms DP emphasised that the 2006 additional assessment was a re-assessment of a loss 
ranking for set-off under paragraph (c), and did not amount to a re-assessment of the taxpayer’s 
taxable income under paragraph (a). The taxpayer’s application for a reduced assessment was 
brought in relation to its taxable income (i.e. paragraph (a)) as it sought to persuade SARS to 
re-assess the quantum of its taxable income pursuant to the erroneous overstatement of its 
income.41 
As the assessment in relation to the taxpayer’s taxable income had been made in 2003 (i.e. 17 
July 2003) that assessment had become final in 2006 and SARS could therefore not revisit it.42 
Harms DP similarly rejected the taxpayer’s argument that it effectively sought a re-assessment 
of the amount of tax payable as contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of “assessment” 
as this amount had only been assessed in 2006 by way of the additional assessment in terms of 
which SARS had disallowed the assessed loss. The learned judge held that this submission was 
merely another formulation of the taxpayer’s argument under paragraph (a) as any re-
assessment of the tax payable under paragraph (b) would by necessary implication also involve 
a re-assessment of taxable income under paragraph (a).43  
In dismissing the appeal the Court noted that the result may seem unfair towards the taxpayer 
in the particular circumstances of the case, but held that any other conclusion regarding the 
meaning of “assessment” would mean that SARS would be able to reconsider the taxpayer’s 
2002 taxable income within three years from the date of the additional assessment being raised 
in 2006. This would have meant that SARS could reconsider the taxable income of R15 892 
978 by way of a new assessment (read determination) thereby possibly raising the taxpayer’s 
2002 taxable income six years subsequent to its original assessment thereof.44  
 
40 This definition has essentially been carried over into the definition of “assessment” contained in section 1 of the Tax Administration Act.  
41 First South African Holdings at [16]. 
42 Ibid. 
43 First South African Holdings at [17]. 
44 First South African Holdings at [18]. 
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Citing the judgment in Brummeria Harms JA remarked: “That is unthinkable”.45 The judgment 
in First South African Holdings therefore confirms the principle expounded in Brummeria to 
the effect that an assessment connotes a determination made by SARS in relation to specific 
subject matter, not a notice of assessment or any other document. 
When considering the relevance and consequences of an assessment one therefore needs to 
identify the aspect in relation to which SARS has satisfied itself in arriving at a decision to 
assess, re-assess, reduce etc.  
Where SARS has previously satisfied itself in relation to a specific decision (i.e. to tax certain 
profits) and issued an assessment accordingly, the period of limitations will begin to run from 
the first time SARS made such a determination, regardless of what other determinations were 
made contemporaneously or what re-assessments may follow thereafter.  
C 3 – CONCLUSION 
What Brummeria and First South African Holdings show us is that, returning to the example 
giving rise to the hypothetical assessment referred to in the introduction, the determination 
made by SARS to tax Company A in terms of section 9D with reference to the profits of the 
CFC, constituted an assessment of that income stream, which once made, precludes repeat 
assessments in relation to the same income.  
It would amount to economical double taxation if SARS were subsequently to decide to tax 
another entity (i.e. the CFC which was later declared to be resident in South Africa) on the 
same income, and any assessment on this basis would thus be incompetent unless sanctioned 
by an extraordinary legislative provision of a nature absent from the Act and the Tax 
Administration Act. 
 
 
45 Ibid. 
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The iniquity that would be flow from this result cannot be overemphasised. The group of 
companies concerned would be forced to pay tax twice on the same profits, a situation that 
Treasury, as mentioned above, explicitly sought to avoid when it introduced section 9D into 
the Act by providing for tax credits in appropriate circumstances. 
Moreover, it will be recalled that section 9D was intended to operate as an anti-avoidance 
measure, not a mechanism to facilitate domestic double taxation. It cannot therefore be said 
that this type of economic double taxation was intended by the Legislature.  
It is therefore submitted that, as the wording of section 9D does not in fact contemplate 
economic double taxation and as the purpose of the section is patently not to achieve this 
purpose, the issue of double taxation in relation to the hypothetical assessment is 
distinguishable from the type of injurious result considered by the SCA in Milnerton Estates 
Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2019 (2) SA 386 where the court 
held that any anomaly flowing from a legislative provision that has iniquitous (and possibly 
unintended) consequences is for the Legislature to correct.46 
There is, additionally, equitable authority militating against an interpretation of section 9D that 
results in the inequities discussed above, for which I turn now to Louw’s case. 
D THE SECOND ARGUMENT: COMMISSIONER FOR INLAND REVENUE v 
LOUW (“LOUW”)47 
Mr Louw, the respondent, was a civil engineer who practised as the senior partner in a firm of 
consulting engineers known as Van Wyk and Louw. During 1966 the partners of the firm 
elected to move the business into a company in which they would hold shares (“the company”). 
Upon incorporation, the newly formed board of directors of the company passed a resolution 
authorising the company to enter into an agreement with the previous partners of Van Wyk and 
 
46 Milnerton Estates at para [21]. 
47 1983 (3) SA 551 (A).  
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Louw in terms of which the business of the erstwhile partnership was sold to the company (“the 
sale agreement”).48 
In terms of the sale agreement, the purchase price to be paid by the company was to equal the 
Rand amount by which the business’ assets exceeded its liabilities. Part of the purchase price 
was to be paid to the partners by allotting shares in the company to them, and part thereof was 
payable by crediting loan accounts in their names. The loan accounts were to bear no interest 
and were repayable as and when the company’s financial position permitted.49  
Directors’ salaries were to be determined on an ad hoc basis at year end and shareholders were 
paid dividends from time to time.50 
The income that Mr Louw earned subsequent to the incorporation of the company (i.e. his 
director’s salary and the dividends owing to him in his capacity as shareholder) was 
substantially less than what he earned in his capacity as partner of Van Wyk and Louw prior 
to its incorporation.51 
Initially, the shareholder’s loan accounts remained in credit but during 1971 these accounts 
went into debit balances on account of significant loans that had been advanced by the company 
out of its retained earnings to the shareholders.52 
On 1 January 1978 SARS issued revised assessments against Mr Louw pursuant to section 103 
of the Act in relation to the years of assessment from 1974 – 1976. In terms of these 
assessments, a proportionate share of the company’s income was included in Mr Louw’s 
income.53  
SARS invoked the provisions of section 103 of the Act in relation to both the transactions 
relating to the incorporation of the company as well as to the loans subsequently advanced to 
 
48 Louw supra at 565. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Louw at 567E. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Louw at 567A. 
53 Louw at 568G. 
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the shareholders and argued that all of the above amounted to a scheme of avoidance the nature 
of which was inconsistent with an arm’s length transaction.54  
On behalf of Mr Louw it was argued that the transactions in question did not amount to a 
scheme as envisaged in section 103 and, furthermore, that SARS was in any event precluded 
from re-opening the relevant assessments inter alia on strength of the provisions of sections 
3(2) and 79 of the Act, as they read at the relevant time. 55 
Section 3(2) of the Act provided that any discretionary decision made by SARS could not be 
withdrawn or amended after a period of two years subsequent to the date on which the taxpayer 
was notified of the decision in question. Section 79 was the section that dealt with the period 
of limitations for the issuance of assessments which has since been repealed and the latest 
permutation of which is now contained in section 99 of the Tax Administration Act.  
The Court held that the transactions in terms of which the company was incorporated and those 
relating to the fronting of loans to shareholders were distinct and could not be viewed as a 
single transaction or scheme for purposes of section 103, and proceeded to find that those 
transactions relating to the incorporation were not abnormal in the manner required to be 
susceptible to the provisions of section 103.56 
What remained, therefore, was to determine the legitimacy or otherwise of SARS’ decision to 
invoke section 103 in relation to the loan transactions. In this regard Corbett JA held that the 
relevant loans were advanced on terms that were irreconcilable with an ordinary arm’s length 
transaction are were thus ‘abnormal’ so as to bring the impugned transactions within the ambit 
of section 103.57 
 
54 Louw at 570. 
55 Louw at 570E. 
56 Louw at 572. 
57 Louw at 582. 
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Having come to this conclusion the Court turned to consider the question as to whether or not 
SARS was precluded from issuing the additional assessments by operations of sections 3(2) 
and 79 of the Act, referred to above.  
The relevant portion of section 79 of the Act was to the effect that, if at any time SARS was 
satisfied that any amount which was subject to tax and should have been assessed to tax under 
the Act had not been assessed to tax, it could re-open an assessment already made in respect of 
such amount, notwithstanding the provisions of the Act relating to the finality of assessments. 
Such ability to re-open assessments was, however, subject inter alia to the proviso that SARS 
could not do so in circumstances where the amount in question was not assessed to tax in 
accordance with a practice generally prevailing at the date of original assessment.58 
The Court rejected the argument advanced on behalf of Mr Louw to the effect that all amounts 
in question that should have been assessed by SARS during the relevant years of assessment 
had been assessed either in the hands of the company or against Mr Louw personally, and that 
there was thus no “amount” that had forgone taxation as contemplated in section 79.59  
Corbett JA held that the reference to an “amount” in section 79 was to an amount in relation to 
a particular taxpayer:60 
“In other words, if a particular amount was subject to tax and should have been, 
but was not, assessed to tax in the hands of taxpayer A, s 79 applies, irrespective 
of the fact that prior to this the same amount may erroneously have been assessed 
in the hands of taxpayer B. Consequently, if in the present case the 
Commissioner came to the conclusion that by reason of the provisions of section 
103 certain income should be taxed in the respondent’s hands, then, in my 
opinion, he was entitled under s 79 to re-open respondent’s assessments and 
issue revised assessments, notwithstanding the fact that the same income may 
previously have been taxed in the hands of the company.” 
 
58 Louw at 582. 
59 Louw at 583. 
60 Ibid. 
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The learned judge was, however, alive to the fact that this conclusion could result in economic 
double taxation in that, in the absence of interference, SARS might proceed to tax Mr Louw in 
terms of section 103 in relation to income that had already been taxed in the hands of the 
company. To that end, Corbett JA held as follows:61 
“Naturally, the Commissioner may not have his cake and eat it. In such a 
situation equity demands that, in applying s 103 to respondent’s affairs, he 
should either make due allowance, where this is appropriate, for the tax already 
paid by the company (as he indeed did in this case) or that he should re-open 
and make a fitting adjustment to the company’s assessments.” 
Reverting once more to the example pertaining to the hypothetical assessment discussed in the 
introduction, it is submitted that the demands of equity would be equally compelling in the 
situation where the erstwhile CFC, now newly resident South African taxpayer, were to be 
taxed on the same income as was previously assessed to tax in the hands of Company A by 
virtue of section 9D.  
It is accordingly submitted that, even were the plea of economic double taxation per se, 
insufficient to persuade SARS not to raise the hypothetical assessment, the judgment in Louw 
constitutes solid authority precluding SARS from proceedings on that basis.  
The decision in Louw would be equally effective in assisting the newly resident CFC from 
staving off the hypothetical assessment in a scenario such as that which obtained in First South 
African Holdings. It will be recalled that in the latter case it was held that SARS was precluded 
from re-opening the relevant assessment in order to issue a reduced assessment in favour of the 
taxpayer (in relation to an undisputed error which gave rise to an overstated tax liability), as 
the period of limitations had expired.  
On the facts of the hypothetical example, it is clear that should the assessment raised against 
Company A in terms of section 9D have prescribed by the time that SARS seeks to raise the 
hypothetical assessment against the newly resident CFC, it will not be able to hide behind the 
 
61 Ibid. 
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period of limitations and argue statutory inability to re-open and correct the section 9D 
assessment, thereby securing a result of economic double taxation. On strength of the judgment 
in Louw, it is submitted that SARS would have to make due allowance for the tax already paid 
pursuant to the prior section 9D assessment.  
The next section of this paper deals with the third and final argument, outlined in the 
introduction, against the competency of the hypothetical assessment and involves an argument 
that taxpayers who were not drawn into South African residency during the subsistence of the 
first issue of SARS’ interpretation note on residency by way of place of effective management 
could resist attempts by SARS to do so now by relying on a practice-generally-prevailing-
argument. 
E THE THIRD ARGUMENT: RESIDENCE BY WAY OF PLACE OF EFFECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT AND THE DEFENCE OF A PRACTICE GENERALLY 
PREVAILING 
E 1 PERIODS OF LIMITATION, PRACTICES GENERALLY 
PREVAILING & RELIANCE ON INTERPRETATION NOTES 
As mentioned above, the period of limitations for the issuance of assessments is now set out in 
section 99 of the Tax Administration Act. The prescription period differs in relation to the 
various types of assessment, whilst in certain instances no additional assessment is permitted 
regardless of the amount of time that has elapsed since the preceding assessment. 
An assessment may not be made three years subsequent to the date of an original assessment 
by SARS or five years subsequent to the date of an original assessment in relation to any self-
assessment (whether or not a return was required for the latter).62 
Additional assessments may not be raised at all in circumstances where the amount that should 
have been assessed to tax under the preceding assessment was not assessed in accordance with 
 
62 Section 99 (1)(a) – (c) of the Tax Administration Act. 
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the practice generally prevailing at the date of such preceding assessment.63 This principle is 
also applicable where the full amount of tax which should have been assessed was not assessed 
in accordance with the practice generally prevailing when the initial assessment was made.64  
The periods of limitation do not apply, and SARS may therefore re-open assessments that 
would otherwise have prescribed, if in the case of an assessment by SARS the full amount of 
tax liability chargeable was not assessed on account of fraud, misrepresentation or non-
disclosure on the part of the taxpayer.65 Similarly, in the case of self-assessments, assessments 
may be re-opened where the full amount of tax chargeable was not assessed due to fraud, 
intentional or negligent misrepresentation, intentional or negligent non-disclosure of material 
facts or the failure to submit a return on the part of the taxpayer.66 
In terms of the definition of “practice generally prevailing” contained in section 1 if the Tax 
Administration Act read with section 5 thereof, a practice generally prevailing is defined as “a 
practice set out in an official publication regarding the application or interpretation of a tax 
Act”. 
Section 5 of the Tax Administration Act further provides that a practice generally prevailing 
only ceases to be such in circumstances where the provision of the tax Act to which it relates 
is repealed or amended, a court has overturned or modified an interpretation of a tax Act which 
is materially the subject of the official publication or where the official publication is 
withdrawn or modified by SARS.67  
An “official publication” is defined in section 1 of the Tax Administration Act and expressly 
includes SARS interpretation notes. 
 
63 Section 99 (1)(d)(i)(aa) of the Tax Administration Act. 
64 Section 99 (1)(d)(i)(bb) of the Tax Administration Act. See also the judgment in CSARS v KWJ Investments Services (Pty) Ltd 81 
SATC 1 where the taxpayer was successful in resisting an assessment based on a practice generally prevailing argument.  
65 Section 99 (2)(a) of the Tax Administration Act. 
66 Section 99 (2)(b) of the Tax Administration Act. 
67 Section 5(2)(a) – (c) of the Tax Administration Act. 
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In the recent case of Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Marshall N.O. and 
Others68 the Supreme Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the role SARS interpretation 
notes play in the interpretation and application of the statutory provisions to which they relate.  
The dispute between the parties in Marshall related to whether or not the taxpayer, a welfare 
organisation and registered vendor, was eligible to zero-rate payments received for certain 
supplies made as contemplated in section 11(2)(n) of the Act. 
The court found for the Commissioner on the basis that the zero-rating provision in question 
did not apply to actual services rendered and dealt only with deemed services where there was 
no link between the payments received and services rendered (i.e. as where the taxpayer 
received grants or subsidies). 
After having analysed the relevant statutory provisions, the court turned to the interpretation 
notes issued by SARS and considered these with reference to the arguments made on behalf of 
the taxpayer. The contents of the said interpretation notes were destructive of the taxpayer’s 
contentions and supported the court’s interpretation of the applicable legislative provisions. 
With regard to the use of interpretation notes as aids to establishing the meaning of fiscal 
legislation, Dambuza JA held as follows:69 
“These interpretation notes, though not binding on the courts or a taxpayer, 
constitute persuasive explanations in relation to the interpretation and 
application of the statutory provision in question. Interpretation Note 39 has 
been in circulation for years and has not been brought into contention until 
now.” 
The taxpayer applied for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court and, in refusing leave, that 
court handed down a brief judgment which was largely focussed on addressing “the extent to 
which a court may consider or defer to an administrative body’s interpretation of legislation, 
 
68 2017 (1) SA 114 (SCA). 
69 Marshall at para [33]. 
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such as the Interpretation Note, and whether the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
in accordance with this.”70  
Whilst the taxpayer contended that the SCA should not have considered the interpretation note 
at all, the Commissioner argued that it was permissible for a court to have regard to an 
administrative body’s interpretation of legislation where such interpretation amounts to proof 
that the provision in question has been interpreted consistently for a period of time by those 
responsible for its administration, and only where such proof was necessary to tip the balance 
in a marginal case of interpretation. 
In its judgment, the Constitutional Court stated there was cause to reconsider the rule relating 
to marginal issues of interpretation (“the rule”) described above, and followed in the important 
case of CSARS v Bosch,71 as the rule traced its origins to the previous dispensation of legislative 
supremacy when the interpretative exercise was aimed at determining the draftsman’s 
intention.72 
Although the Constitutional Court noted that the judgment in CSARS v Bosch had 
acknowledged that the rule needed to be adapted to contextual statutory interpretation,73 it 
stated that the fundamental contextual change from legislative to constitutional supremacy was 
missing from the adaptation of the rule as expounded in Bosch.74 
In this regard the Court commented as follows: 
“Why should a unilateral practice of one part of the executive arm of government 
play a role in the determination of the reasonable meaning to be given to a 
statutory provision? It might conceivably be justified where the practice is 
evidence of an impartial application of a custom recognised by all concerned, 
 
70 Marshall NO & Others  v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2019 (6) SA 246 (CC). 
71 2015 (2) SA 174 (SCA). 
72 Marshall NO & Others  v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2019 (6) SA 246 (CC) at para [7]. 
73 Such adaptation entails a change in rationale for considering the manner in which an administrative body has interpreted legislation, what 
is gleaned therefore no longer redounds to “custom” but instead provides evidence in determining “the meaning that should reasonably be 
placed upon” the relevant language. 
74 Marshall NO & Others  v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2019 (6) SA 246 (CC) at para [10]. 
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but not where the practice is unilaterally established by one of the litigating 
parties. In those circumstances it is difficult to see what advantage evidence of 
the unilateral practice will have for the objective and independent interpretation 
by the courts of the meaning of legislation, in accordance with constitutionally 
compliant precepts. It is best avoided.” 
Ultimately, leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was refused on the basis that the 
taxpayer’s case carried poor prospects of success and on account of the fact that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal had first interpreted the relevant statutory provisions independently before 
having regard to the interpretation note, and the court’s objective interpretation as aforesaid 
supports that court’s ultimate conclusion. 
Although the judgments in Marshall may well have far reaching consequences for the rule 
pertaining to cases of marginal statutory interpretation, it does not, it is submitted, have any 
bearing on the relevance of interpretation notes as they relate to practices generally prevailing.  
This is because the latter does not necessarily entail questions of marginal statutory 
interpretation, and more importantly, by virtue of the fact that section 5 of the Tax 
Administration Act expressly states that a practice generally prevailing is one ‘set out in an 
official publication regarding the application or interpretation of a tax Act’. 
Having established these fundamental principles regarding the time periods within which 
SARS may re-open assessments and as to what constitutes a practice generally prevailing, the 
next section deals with tax residency on the basis of place of effective management.  
E 2 RESIDENCE BY WAY OF PLACE OF EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 
In terms of the definition of “resident” contained in section 1 of the Act, a person, other than a 
natural person, is a tax resident of South Africa if it is incorporated, established or formed in 
the Republic or if it has its place of effective management in the Republic.  
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This definition of residence was inserted when South Africa’s taxation system became 
residence-based, and the inclusion of the term “place of effective management” was clearly 
made to ensure that the maximum possible number of taxpayers could be assessed based on 
their worldwide receipts. The term “place of effective management” is also said to have been 
introduced to address the inconsistent use of the concepts “managed and controlled”, “managed 
or controlled” and “effectively managed”.75 
“Place of effective management” is not, however, defined in any tax Act. From inception 
SARS, in terms of the first issue of its practice note on the subject (which is discussed 
comprehensively below), adopted the position that the ordinary meaning of the words, taking 
into account international precedent and interpretation, should serve to ascribe a meaning 
thereto. 
The use of this test for residence has resulted in some controversy on account of, inter alia, (i) 
the fact that there is no authoritative South African case law to clarify the meaning of the term 
or its application in the context of companies,76 (ii) the fact that foreign case law indicates that 
“place of effective management” residency may cause tension with the provisions of section 
9D of the Act, and (iii) the fact that SARS’ interpretation notes on the subject appear to have 
displayed a shift in the meaning which SARS attributes to the term “place of effective 
management”.77  
The friction between “place of effective management” as a test for residency and the CFC 
provisions of the Act (i.e. (ii) above) arises on account of the fact that classification as a 
controlled foreign company necessarily entails non-residence coupled with the fact that a South 
African resident (or South African residents) hold(s) more than fifty percent of the participation 
rights in such foreign company.  
 
75 SARS Interpretation Note No 6 (Issue 1) at para 1.  
76 Although the Court in Oceanic dealt with the issue to some extent, it was decided in the context of a trust and, in any event, the Court 
held that there were insufficient facts placed before it to make a determination. Oceanic is therefore merely persuasive in general terms.  
77 See in general: Tracy Gutuza ‘Has Recent United Kingdom Case Law Affected the Interplay Between “Place of Effective Management” 
and “Controlled Foreign Companies”?’ (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424-437 and Annet Wanyana Oguttu ‘Resolving The Conflict Between 
Controlled Foreign Company Legislation and Tax Treaties: A South African Perspective’ (2009) 42 Comparative and International Journal 
of Southern Africa 73.  
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Depending on how one formulates the test for place of effective management, it is possible that 
possession of more than 50 percent of participation rights in a foreign company could result in 
that company being declared resident in South Africa. The risk of this occurring is especially 
high in circumstances where the control of a company vests in only one or two individuals 
leading to singularity of shareholding and management. 78 
In the English case of Laerstate BV v Revenue and Customs Commissioners79 the Court had to 
determine whether the tax residence of the taxpayer, a Dutch company, was located in the 
United Kingdom, or in the Netherlands. The inquiry into residence was characterised by the 
fact that, during the period under consideration, the taxpayer had only two directors, one of 
whom was its sole shareholder and was only in office for a part of the relevant time. 
It was common cause that the test for residency of a company in terms of the applicable United 
Kingdom tax Act was determined by identifying where the taxpayer’s “central management 
and control abides”.80 
The Court’s inquiry focused, inter alia, on the conduct of one Mr Bock who held the entire 
shareholding in the taxpayer, had been a director of the taxpayer and was found to have retained 
central decision-making authority in relation thereto even after he was no longer a director. 
Counsel for the taxpayer argued that central management and control of the taxpayer should 
be determined with reference to the taxpayer company’s constitutional documentation, the 
location where company resolutions are made or official documents signed.81 
Whilst counsel for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) accepted that a company’s 
management and control would be located within the boardroom in circumstances where the 
board was actually taking the relevant decisions, he argued that on the facts of the case those 
decisions were in fact being taken by Mr Bock, even after his resignation from the board.82The 
Court accepted HMRC’s argument and held that the taxpayer had been resident in the United 
Kingdom. The Court’s judgment was based firmly on its analysis and determination of 
 
78 For a comprehensive analysis on this topic see Gutuza note 54 supra at page 430.  
79 [2009] UKFTT 209 (TC). 
80 Laerstate at para 27.  
81 Laerstate at para 25. 
82 Laerstate at para 26. 
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shareholder activity that amounted to or resulted in the effective control and management of 
the company.  
The judgment in Laerstate cannot be criticised for its reasoning, which is clearly logical, but if 
a similar test for residence were to be applied in South Africa the possibility exists that the 
distinction between “place of effective management” and the threshold requirement of 51 
percent participation rights for purposes of the controlled foreign company rules would merge, 
thereby drawing controlled foreign companies into South African tax residency.83  
I turn now to consider the position in South Africa with reference to case law and SARS 
interpretation notes relating to place of effective management as a test for residency. Part E 
then concludes with an analysis of the judgment of the Australian High Court in Bywater 
Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation.  
E 2.1 – SARS Income Tax Interpretation Note 6 – Issue 1 
Interpretation Note 6 (“IN 6”) Issue 1 was published on 26 March 2002 and dealt with residence 
by way of place of effective management in relation to persons other than natural persons.  
The first issue of IN 6 emphasised that effective management was not tantamount to 
shareholder control or control by the board of directors but rather a question of management 
determined with regard to the entity’s purpose and business.84 
The general approach to determining effective management amounted to an inquiry as to where 
the company was managed on a regular or day-to-day basis, regardless of where “overriding” 
control was exercised or where the board of directors met (i.e. not shareholder-function).85 
Under the heading “practical application” of the first issue of IN 6 the following was stated:86 
 
83 Gutuza note 54 supra at page 436. 
84 IN 6 Issue 1 at para 3.1.  
85 IN 6 Issue 1 at para 3.2. 
86 At para 3.3.  
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“If these management functions are not executed at a single location due to the 
fact that directors or senior managers manage via distance communication (e.g. 
telephone, internet, video conferencing, etc.) the view is held that place of 
effective management would best be reflected where the day-to-day operational 
management and commercial decisions taken by the senior managers are 
actually implemented, in other words, the place where the business 
operations/activities are actually carried out or conducted.” 
(emphasis provided.) 
It is submitted that the interpretation of the test for place of effective management residency 
contained in the first issue of IN 6 was therefore clearly based on “day-to-day operational 
management” as opposed to considerations of high level, overarching strategic or policy 
decisions. 
With regards to the taxation of controlled foreign companies, the first issue of IN 6 merely 
stated that should a company be resident in South Africa on account of its place of effective 
management it will not be regarded as a controlled foreign company but as a resident 
susceptible to South African income tax in its own right. Although not specifically stated, one 
wonders whether the “day-to-day” approach to residence which characterises the first issue of 
IN 6 was not specifically adopted in order to achieve congruence between residence and section 
9D of the Act.  
The approach adopted by SARS in IN6 Issue 1 was, however, abandoned in favour of an 
entirely novel interpretation of the concept of “place of effective management” subsequent to 
the decision of the Western Cape High Court in Oceanic, which is the topic discussed under 
the next section. 
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E 2.2 – Oceanic Trust Company Ltd N.O. v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service87 (“Oceanic”) 
Oceanic was registered and incorporated in terms of the laws of Mauritius and had its principal 
place of business in Port Louis. Oceanic was the sole trustee of SISM, a trust similarly 
established and registered in Mauritius.88 
In terms of SISM’s deed of settlement Oceanic was designated as its original trustee and 
Mauritian law governed all aspects of the trust, it was also prescribed by the deed that trustees 
must have their principal place of business in Mauritius and conduct their affairs from premises 
in Mauritius. SISM was also registered as a trust in South Africa in terms of the South African 
Trust Property Control Act, 57 of 1988.89 
SISM was established to conduct business as a captive reinsurer of a South African  registered 
company, mCubed Life Limited. Income derived by SISM by way of policy premiums in this 
regard was invested, inter alia, in South Africa in a variety of investments. To this end SISM 
made use of the services of an asset manager in South Africa to manage its investments.90 
At all relevant times SISM rendered income tax returns to the Mauritian revenue authorities 
and was of the opinion that it had no tax obligations in South Africa.91 In 2008 SARS issued a 
notice to SISM indicating its intention to conduct an audit and requesting relevant information. 
Oceanic responded to the audit notice in its capacity as SISM’s sole trustee and provided the 
information sought by SARS without conceding any liability to tax in South Africa.92 
Subsequently, SARS raised income tax assessments against SISM in the amount of R1.5 billion 
including additional tax and interest. It did so on the basis that SISM was resident in the 
Republic because it had its place of effective management in South Africa or, alternatively, on 
 
87 (2012) 74 SATC 127. 
88 Oceanic at paras [1] – [3].  
89 Oceanic at para [3]. 
90 Oceanic at para [4]. 
91 Oceanic at para [5]. 
92 Oceanic at para [6]. 
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the basis that SISM derived income from a South African source that carried on business 
through a permanent establishment in South Africa.93 
SISM filed an objection to this assessment but SARS, in the interim, appointed SISM’s bankers 
(the Standard Bank of South Africa) as an agent and required the latter to remit the full amount 
of SISM’s assessed tax liability to SARS. Pursuant to this agency appointment, Standard Bank 
paid an amount in excess of R20 million over to SARS.94 
Oceanic, in its capacity as the sole trustee of SISM, filed an urgent application in the Western 
Cape Division of the High Court in terms of which it sought, inter alia, declaratory orders to 
the effect that SISM was not tax resident in South Africa and that SARS was thus liable to 
repay the amount or R20 million that it had received pursuant to the agency appointment.95 
Louw J essentially dismissed the application on the basis that declaratory relief could only be 
granted in relation to questions of law and that the issue before the Court would require, at least 
partially, a determination of facts. In reaching this conclusion the Court based its reasoning on 
the English case of Commissioner for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Smallwood and 
Another96 which had been submitted by Oceanic in support of its application for a declarator.97  
The learned judge analysed the decision in Smallwood and held that the following principles 
relating to the determination of “place of effective management” (“POEM”), as originally 
contained in the OECD’s Model Tax Convention, could be extracted therefrom:98 
POEM is the place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for 
the conduct of the entity’s business are in substance made; 
 
93 Oceanic at para [7]. 
94 Oceanic at para [9]. 
95 Oceanic at para [11]. 
96 [2010] EWCA Civ 778.  
97 Oceanic at para [56]. 
98 Oceanic at para [54]. 
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i. POEM will ordinarily be the place where the most senior group of persons (e.g. 
a board of directors) makes its decision, where the actions to be taken by the 
entity as a whole are determined; 
 
ii. No definite rules can be given and all relevant facts and circumstances must be 
examined to determine the POEM of an entity; 
 
iii. There may be more than one place of management, but only one POEM at any 
one time; 
 
iv. The decision in Smallwood was not only based on the general test for POEM 
but also on the specific section of the UK legislation which provided that the 
trustees be treated as a single and continuing body of persons who shall be 
treated as resident in the UK unless the general administration of the trust is 
ordinarily carried on outside the United Kingdom and the trustees or the 
majority of them for the time being are not resident or not ordinarily resident in 
the United Kingdom; and 
 
v. The Court in Smallwood undertook a painstaking analysis of the facts and the 
way the scheme was set up and implemented in order to arrive at a conclusion 
regarding where the POEM of the trust in that case was located. 
Having regard to the test for place of effective management set out in Smallwood, Louw J held 
that Oceanic had failed to make out a case for declaratory relief on two bases. 
Firstly, as indicated above, the learned judge held that a determination of residency would of 
necessity involve factual findings regarding where SISM’s key management and commercial 
decisions necessary for the conduct of SISM’s business were in substance made during the 
relevant period. The inquiry regarding SISM’s residency was therefore not simply a question 
of law and the matter would have to be decided at first instance by the Tax Court.99 
 
99 Oceanic at para [57]. 
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Louw J could have left the matter there but instead proceeded to set out the second basis on 
which he dismissed Oceanic’s application. The learned judge held that even if the facts before 
the Court had been sufficiently clear to allow the Court to make a decision, they did not in their 
present form put up grounds to establish that the place where the key management and 
commercial decisions that were necessary for the conduct of SISM’s business were in 
substance made outside of South Africa. SISM’s place of effective management had thus not 
been demonstrated to be outside the Republic.100  
The Court held that on the facts before it “at least some of the key management decisions and 
at the very least, key commercial decisions necessary for the conduct of SISM’s business were 
in substance made in South Africa”.101 Thus, on an application of the Smallwood-test the facts 
did not establish that SISM’s place of effective management was located in Mauritius and the 
application was dismissed. 
In reaching his decision the learned judge did not have any regard to SARS’ IN 6 Issue 1 and 
determined the case on the basis of the decision in Smallwood. 
It is submitted that the test for place of effective management expounded in Smallwood differs 
materially from that contained in the first issue of SARS’ interpretation note on the topic. 
Whereas SARS’ interpretation of the concept focused on the day-to-day activities of the entity, 
the test in Smallwood (and consequently the test in Oceanic) centres the inquiry on high-level 
strategic management. The two approaches are thus antithetical. 
As was pointed out by Gutuza,102 the inquiry in Oceanic (as in Smallwood) related to a trust 
and not a company. It is, however, submitted that the general ratio of these judgments with 
regard to the manner in which place of effective management is determined is no less 
persuasive on this score and need only be considered in context when one is concerned with 
determining the place of effective management of a company.  
 
100 Oceanic at para [58]. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Note 54 supra at page 434. 
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E 2.3 – SARS Income Tax Interpretation Note 6 – Issue 2 
On 3 November 2015, subsequent and presumably in response to the Oceanic judgment, SARS 
released the second issue of Interpretation Note 6 which is still in force. 
IN 6 Issue 2 specifically cites the judgments in Oceanic and Smallwood and, it is submitted, 
constitutes a departure from the interpretation contained in the first issue. The second issue of 
the interpretation note states that place of effective management means the place where key 
management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s 
business as a whole are in substance made.103  
The second issue of the interpretation note also cites the case of Wensleydale’s Settlement 
Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners104 which had been decided in 1996 (i.e. prior to the 
first issue of IN 6). The salient portion of the judgment in Wensleydale quoted in IN 6 Issue 2 
concludes with the remark that “The place of effective management is where the shots are 
called, to adopt a vivid transatlantic colloquialism”.105 
With reference to Smallwood IN6 Issue 2 specifically mentions that where there is a distinction 
between the scheme of management (i.e. the key management and commercial decisions that 
are taken) and the day-to-day management exercised by trustees the former will be 
determinative of the entity’s place of effective management.106 
Developing this interpretation IN6 Issue 2 proceeds, under the heading “operational 
management versus broader top-level management”, to state that operational decisions 
generally have little relevance in the inquiry to determine place of effective management and 
must be distinguished from the key management and commercial decisions.107 
 
103 IN 6 Issue 2 at para 4.1.  
104 [1996] STC (SCD) 241.  
105 IN 6 Issue 2 at para 4.1 on page 5 – being the exact wording used in the OECD MTC. 
106 Ibid.  
107 IN 6 Issue 2 at para 4.2.6 on page 11. 
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Operational management is interpreted as being the oversight of the day-to-day business 
operations and activities of the company whereas key management and commercial decisions 
relate to broader strategic and policy decisions, which tend to be taken by members of senior 
management: “what constitutes a key management or commercial decision as opposed to an 
operational management decision is critical since it is the former that is relevant in the context 
of establishing the place of effective management.”108 
Of great importance is the statement at the end of IN6 Issue 2 to the effect that it is not 
anticipated that the application of the second issue of the interpretation note, as opposed to the 
first, will result in “many, if any” determinations that companies that were previously held to 
have their place of effective management abroad, now have their place of effective 
management in South Africa.109 IN 6 Issue 2 only applies to years of assessment commencing 
subsequent to its issue (i.e. as it was issued during November 2015 it will be applicable from 
the 2017 year of assessment).  
Before turning to discuss the effect of the change of approach evidenced between the first and 
second issues of IN6, I pause to consider the Australian decision of Bywater which lends some 
international perspective to the debate on the interpretation of place of effective management.  
E 2.4 – BYWATER INVESTMENTS LTD v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION; 
HUA WANG BANK BERHAD v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION 
(“BYWATER”)110 
In its recent111 judgment in Bywater the High Court of Australia, being the apex court of that 
country and not the equivalent of its titular counterpart in South Africa, was called upon to 
decide whether or not the appellant companies were resident in Australia by virtue of their 
“central management and control” having being exercised there during the relevant years of 
assessment.  
 
108 IN 6 Issue 2 at para 4.2.6 on page 12. 
109 IN 6 Issue 2 at para 5 on page 14. 
110 High Court of Australia: [2016] HCA 45.  
111 Judgment handed down on 16 November 2016.  
 34 
Section 6(1) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) provides, inter alia, that 
a foreign company will be a tax resident of Australia if its “central management and control” 
is found to be exercised in Australia in a manner that is analogous to the “place of effective 
management” criterion contained in the definition of “resident” contained in section 1 of the 
South African Income Tax Act.  
The appeal concerns four appellant companies against which the Full Court of the Federal 
Court of Australia had made orders declaring them to be tax resident in Australia on account 
of the fact that their central management and control had been found to have been exercised 
there via a third-party accountant by the name of Mr Gould. These orders were made in 
circumstances where the appellants’ boards of directors were all located abroad and purported 
to perform the usual functions expected of a board.112 
For convenience sake I refer to the first three appellants (i.e. Bywater, Chemical Trustee and 
Derrin) collectively as ‘Bywater’, and to the fourth appellant, Hua Wang Bank Berhad, as 
‘HWB’.   
Counsel for all the appellants accepted that, should the Court find that the relevant companies 
had their central control and management exercised from Australia, the same would hold true 
for their respective places of effective management as contemplated in the relevant double tax 
agreements in issue, and that the appellants would thus not be protected from Australian taxes 
by virtue of those agreements.113  
In the High Court, the following argument was advanced on behalf of Bywater: 
i. the courts below had erred in focusing on the question of decision-making (which 
was found to have been a function of Mr Gould) as opposed to considering where 
the “formal organs of control” of the entities lay. It was argued that references in 
the authorities to concepts such as the “real business” of a company or to the 
“superior or directing authority” thereof (which had previously been laid down as 
 
112 Bywater at para 3, 12, 16, 20, 26 and 28. 
113 Bywater at para 6. 
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indicators of the locus of “central management and control” and thus residency), 
connoted a company’s “constitutional organs” or its “lawful organs with authority 
to bind” it: all of the above ultimately being a reference (or so it was said) to the 
companies’ respective boards;114 
 
ii. save for two exceptions, an individual could not be deemed to form part of the 
“constitutional organs”, “real business” or “superior directing authority” of a 
company unless that person is a legally appointed director of that company. On 
this basis, it was contended that an individual who takes decisions on behalf of a 
company could not be regarded as exercising the “central management and 
control” of that company unless he or she was a director thereof;115 
 
 
iii. the mere fact that a board of directors may habitually elect to act in accordance 
with the advice of a party who is not part of the company’s “lawful organs of 
corporate control”, does not mean that the said third party exercises that 
company’s “central management and control”. This was said to be the case even 
where the board “invariably” follows the third-party’s advice “without any 
thought” being given to the merits thereof or to the question as to whether such 
advice was bona fide or otherwise in the company’s best interests;116 
 
iv. the only exceptions to this was argued to be situations where (i) a third party holds 
a legally enforceable right to compel directors to act in accordance with his or her 
directions, or, (ii) where a third party usurps the functions of the board by making 
and implementing central management and control decisions without going 
through the formality of referring such decisions to the directors for 
implementation as if these were decisions of the board;117 
 
v. In the event, it was contended that as Mr Gould was not part of the lawfully 
appointed constitutional organs of the appellants, and by virtue of the fact that no 
 
114 Bywater at para 30. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Bywater at para 31. 
117 Ibid.  
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evidence had been led to demonstrate that Mr Gould fell into the category of one 
of the exceptions mentioned above, the court below ought to have found that it 
was the directors of the companies alone who exercised central management and 
control. As all the relevant boards were located abroad, the appellants could thus 
not have been drawn into Australian tax residency. 
Argument on behalf of HWB followed a similar pattern and can be summarised as follows:118 
i. The court below had erred in failing to recognise that the “real business” or 
“superior or directing authority” of a company must be “organic” thereto, 
something that Mr Gould, as a third-party, was not; 
 
ii. The authorities should correctly be interpreted as demonstrating that a company 
is resident at the place where its organs meet to make decisions, even if that 
decision-making process amounts to no more than the rubber-stamping of 
decisions made elsewhere; 
 
iii. This would be the case unless the board has ceased to function and merely 
implements decisions made elsewhere without any board involvement.  
The Commissioner, on the other hand, relied on the decision of the House of Lords in De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe [1907] UKHL 626, in arguing that a taxpayer company’s 
central management and control is located where:119 
“…the company’s ‘real business’ is carried on, the real business of a company 
is carried on at the place from where its operations are controlled and directed, 
and the place whence its operations are controlled and directed is invariably ‘a 
pure question of fact to be determined, not according to the construction of this 
 
118 Bywater at para 35 – 36. 
119 Bywater at para 37. 
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or that regulation or bye-law, but upon a scrutiny of the course of business and 
trading’”. 
The Commissioner conceded that scenarios could arise in which a board of directors retained 
its function while approving and implementing the advice of third parties, but contended that 
in such circumstances the board would have to ‘exercise independent judgment as to whether 
to implement the steps advised’. In the present case, however, the court below had found that 
the role played by the Bywater boards was fake, and that the board of HWB only performed 
back-office functions.120  
In dismissing the appeals before it, the majority121 of the High Court held that the central issue 
for determination was the question as to whether, in view of the findings of the court below in 
relation to the substantive decision-making role played by Mr Gould and the correlating 
absence of decision-making functionality on the part of the various boards of directors, the 
location of the boards in foreign jurisdiction was ‘sufficient to locate the residence of the 
appellants abroad’.122 
In this regard the Court recognised that it was, ordinarily, the board of directors of a company 
that “makes the higher-level decisions which set policy and determine the direction of 
operations and transactions of a company” and that, for this reason, it will ordinarily be found 
that a company is resident in the jurisdiction where its board meets. Rejecting the arguments 
advanced by the appellants, the Court held that it does not follow from what is stated above 
that the “ordinary” result would obtain where a board:123 
“abrogates its decision-making power in favour of an outsider and operates as 
a puppet or cypher, effectively doing no more than noting and implementing 
decisions made by the outsider as if they were in truth decisions of the board.” 
 
120 Bywater at para 37. 
121 Four of the five justices on the panel concurred in the majority judgment while Gordon J penned a concurring minority judgment. 
122 Bywater at para 41. 
123 Ibid. 
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The Court confirmed that the correct position with regard to residency by way of place of 
“central management and control” was that “a company had its central management and control 
where the central management and control actually abides, that being a question of fact and 
degree to be determined according to the facts and circumstances of each case”.124 
The judgment proceeds with a comprehensive review of the relevant Australian case law and, 
in each instance, the Court indicates that even where the facts of a previous decision appeared 
to be better aligned with the appellants’ argument that the location of the board was the critical 
consideration in determining the residency of the company concerned, the only precedential 
value therein was that it served to demonstrate that each case was decided on its own peculiar 
facts and circumstances, and that this “of itself says nothing about what the result should be in 
other circumstances…”125 
With regard to the case law pertaining to the test for residence, the Court acknowledged that 
the Australian jurisprudence had developed from several United Kingdom decisions.126 The 
Court accordingly also considered recent decisions from that jurisdiction127 such as the cases 
of Wood v Holden [2006] 1 WLR 1393 and Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Smallwood 
[2010] BTC 637. 
In Wood v Holden the English Court of Appeal had drawn a distinction between residency 
cases where “central management and control is exercised through a company’s constitutional 
organs on the basis of external advice or influence, but in fulfilment of the constitutional 
organ’s functions” on the one hand, and cases where “the functions of the company’s 
constitutional organs are usurped by an outsider who dictates the decisions to be implemented, 
independently of or without regard to those constitutional organs.” 
 
124 Bywater at para 40. 
125 Bywater at, for example, paras 53 – 54. 
126 Bywater at para 40. 
127 Bywater at paras 70 – 77. 
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The High Court noted that the reasoning employed in the recent United Kingdom decisions 
under consideration also “rested heavily” on the specific facts of the relevant case in order to 
determine the question of tax residency.128 
The Court also had regard to judgments from the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United 
States of America, the reasoning and conclusions of which were in keeping with the approach 
in terms of which each case had to be determined contextually with reference to its own facts, 
the ultimate question being where the central management and control actually takes place. 
The Court quoted the following extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United 
States of America in Hertz Corp v Friend 599 US 77:129 
“[the statutory criterion of ‘principal place of business’ is] best read as 
referring to the place where [the] corporation’s officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities. It is the place that Courts of Appeals 
have called the corporation’s ‘nerve centre’. And in practice it should normally 
be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters – provided that 
the headquarters is the actual centre of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., 
the ‘nerve centre’, and is not simply an office where the corporation holds its 
board meetings (for example attended by directors and officers who have 
travelled there for the occasion),” 
In the event, the Court dismissed the appeals on the basis that the question of residence was to 
be determined with reference to the location of the high-level decision-making organs of the 
companies, and that as this function had been performed by Mr Gould in Australia, the 
companies were liable to tax as residents of Australia.130  
Bywater is compelling authority, supported by leading decisions from the eminent 
commonwealth jurisdictions, to the effect that the correct approach to be adopted in 
determining tax residency is one that considers where the executive, policy-determining 
management of a company is exercised with reference to the facts of the relevant case, and not 
 
128 Bywater at para 71. 
129 Bywater at para 84. 
130 Bywater at para 88 read with para 41. 
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where “the day-to-day operational management and commercial decisions taken by the senior 
managers are actually implemented”.131 
The test applied in Bywater is by no means novel, and can trace the roots of its reasoning 
directly back to the 1876 judgment of the United Kingdom Court of Exchequer in Cesena 
Sulphur Company v Nicholson.132 
E 3 CONCLUSIONS 
Of what import is all of this to the hypothetical assessment and hypothetical newly-resident 
CFC described in the example provided in the introduction? It serves to demonstrate that the 
approach adopted by SARS in IN 6 Issue 1 was diametrically opposed to the established test 
for residency by way of place of effective management that had been applied in the leading 
common law jurisdictions since the latter half of the 19th century. 
It is submitted that for the duration of the validity of IN 6 Issue 1 (i.e. from 26 March 2002 
until 1 March 2016) there is a compelling argument to be made to the effect that the practice 
generally prevailing at SARS was to determine place of effective management by determining 
where high-level policy decisions made by top management were implemented, as opposed to 
where they were made.  
It is inconceivable that SARS could have formulated its approach in this regard in ignorance 
of the established position that prevailed in the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, Canada, 
the United States and Australia. It is submitted that SARS’ position on the issue as contained 
in IN 6 Issue 1 is all the more indicative of a considered, domestic policy-based interpretation 
of the concept of place of effective management on account of the degree to which it differed 
from the position adopted in foreign jurisdictions to which recourse is customarily had for 
guidance.  
 
131 Which was the approach expounded in SARS Interpretation Note 6 Issue 1. 
132 (1876) 1 Ex D 428 at 446-447 per Kelly CB, 453-454 per Huddleston B.. 
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It is therefore further submitted that, should SARS attempt to raise the hypothetical assessment 
in relation to years of assessment falling within the period of validity of IN 6 Issue 1 against a 
CFC which was not considered to be a South African resident at the relevant time, SARS would 
be precluded from doing so now by applying the approach to determining residency expounded 
in IN 6 Issue 2 on the basis that such hypothetical assessment would be in the nature of that 
prohibited by section 99(d)(i)(aa) of the Tax Administration Act (i.e. an amount that had not 
been assessed to tax contemporaneously in accordance with a practice generally prevailing).  
It must also be noted that although Oceanic does not amount to conclusive authority for the 
position that South African courts will adopt should they be called upon to define the approach 
to be followed in applying the test for residency by way of place of effective management in 
South Africa in future, it is unlikely that any subsequent court would come to a different 
conclusion, especially when regard is had to the decision in Bywater and the slew of 
international authorities on which it is premised. 
F FINAL REMARKS 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the course of action contemplated by SARS in the example 
culminating in the issuance of the hypothetical assessment is overtly incorrect and unjust, 
would offend the principle prohibiting economic double taxation and is clearly contrary to the 
stated purpose behind the enactment of section 9D of the Act. 
It is understandable that revenue authorities in any jurisdiction that taxes income with reference 
to residence should concern themselves with avoidance schemes whereby profits are shifted to 
foreign entities, but to allow the application of the CFC rules (already fraught with the tension 
of possible treaty-override) and the test for residence to be applied cumulatively and in 
succession to the effect suggested in the hypothetical example would, with respect, be a step 
too far. 
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 1 
A INTRODUCTION 
The insertion of section 7C into the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (“the Act”) in 2017, and the 
amendments that have subsequently been made thereto, have resulted in a significant disruption 
to the manner in which tax structures had traditionally been employed in South Africa.  
Section 7C encapsulates a policy decision taken by Treasury to clamp down on the manner in 
which trusts had been employed to widespread success to dilute the taxable income of the tax 
base. 
Prior to the insertion of section 7C, donations tax was generally not payable on favourable (i.e. 
non-market related) loan accounts held in trust structures. The only tax exposure that the 
gratuitous settlor faced previously was liability in relation to the interest income earned by the 
trust in circumstances where a stipulation or legislative provision (such as section 7(5) of the 
Act) prevented the beneficiaries from accessing the income.  
In such circumstances, the settlor was saddled with the income tax liability in relation to the 
income earned by the trust and the initial settlement amount was regarded as being an ongoing 
donation for income tax purposes, as least since the decision of the Appellate Division in 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Berold 1962 (3) SA 748 (A). 
Section 7C was first inserted into the Act during March 2017 and was amended twice 
thereafter, in both instances with effect from 19 July 2017. The section subjects loans, advances 
or credit transactions, which are interest free or levy interest below market rates, to tax by 
deeming the interest forgone to be a donation and raising donations tax accordingly.133 
This paper discusses the alleged retrospective effect of section 7C in original and subsequent 
iterations to determine firstly, whether such retrospective effect is in fact present, secondly, to 
 
133 This being a departure from the position which prevailed previously, as to which see in general 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd & Others 2007 (6) SA 
601 (SCA).  
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determine the nature of such retrospective effect if found to be present and, thirdly, to examine 
whether the section may be attacked on the basis of its retrospectivity. 
In order to achieve this purpose, the paper starts by analysing section 7C in both its original 
and amended forms. The recent decision of Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service and Another 134  which was concerned with an attack on 
retrospective fiscal legislation is then considered in detail and the conclusions drawn therefrom 
are employed in a discussion on the prospects of success that a similar attack on section 7C 
might carry. The paper concludes with some general remarks and a discussion on an exception 
to which, it will be argued, section 7C does not apply.  
The next section commences with an overview of the language in which section 7C was 
originally enacted.  
B AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST ITERATION OF SECTION 7C 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum published by Treasury in relation to the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Bill of 2016 (“the 2016 Explanatory Memorandum”), Section 7C was 
introduced in order to “prevent estate duty and donations tax avoidance through the use of 
interest free or low interest loans”.135 
The 2016 Explanatory Memorandum sets out the three main tax avoidance planning techniques 
used by taxpayers to facilitate the transfer of assets into a trust namely, a donation, a loan-sale 
transaction and a loan transaction. 
The donation technique is where a taxpayer donates assets to a trust. The transaction gives rise 
to a donations tax liability that is payable by the donor and is levied at 20 percent of the fair 
market value of the assets donated. 136  The donations tax may also be recouped from the donee, 
 
134 2017 (6) SA 435 (GP). 
135 Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 17B of 2016 at para 1.6.  
136 Section 54 of the Act.  
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jointly and severally, in circumstances where the donor fails to make timeous payment 
thereon.137 
The second mechanism by which assets may be transferred into trust is a sale transaction on 
loan account. Should the interest charged on the loan-sale transaction be market related the 
person advancing the funds would be taxed on the interest component of the loan repayments 
received from the trust.  
Thirdly, a loan may be advanced to a trust, either to fund the acquisition of trust assets or simply 
in order for the trust to retain the funds for capital growth. Should the interest charged on the 
loan transaction be market related, the person advancing the funds would be taxed on the 
interest component of the loan repayments received from the trust. 
Prior to the insertion of section 7C, however, it was easy for taxpayers to avoid both donations 
tax liability and tax liability on interest received, as described above, by simply concluding 
either loan-sale or pure loan transactions and charging either no interest at all or by charging 
interest below the market-related rate. Consequently, no donation arises as nothing is donated 
into trust and, as no interest is charged or as interest is charged below the market rate, the 
person advancing the funds also escapes liability to income tax in this regard either partially or 
entirely, as the case may be. 
In addition to the aforesaid, the tax base was being eroded in a further respect as taxpayers 
were prone to reduce or waive the capital amount of the loan advanced by them to the trust138 
resulting in a further diminution in the estate of the taxpayer which would eventually result in 
even less estate duty being payable to the fiscus.  
The 2016 Explanatory Memorandum therefore cites the avoidance of estate duty and donations 
tax on the transfer of wealth through the use of interest free loans or loans with interest below 
 
137 Section 59 of the Act.  
138 Hence section 7C(2).  
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market rates as the reason for the insertion of section 7C, its stated purpose being to limit 
taxpayers’ ability to transfer wealth to a trust without being subjected to tax in this regard.  
The first version of Section 7C was deemed to have come into operation on 19 July 2017,139 
and applied in respect of any amount owed by a trust in respect of a loan, advance or credit 
provided to that trust before, on or after that date.140 
Section 7C’s response to the avoidance strategies discussed in the introduction was twofold. 
First, it served to refuse deductions, losses, allowances and capital losses sought to be claimed 
in relation to loans, advances or credit transactions contemplated in section 7C (1)141 and, 
second, it levied donations tax on any interest forgone on an interest-free loan, advance or 
credit to a trust or, alternatively, the amount of interest charged below the official interest rate. 
The amounts deemed to be donations as aforesaid were instead treated as a donation made on 
the last day of the relevant year of assessment and assessed to tax accordingly.142 
In order for section 7C’s anti-avoidance provisions to apply the target loan transaction between 
the taxpayer and the trust must (i) have been advanced to the trust by a certain type of natural 
person or company and (ii) possess certain characteristics. 
In terms of the first iteration of section 7C (1) the loan, advance or credit must have been 
advanced to a trust either by a natural person, or by a company at the instance of a person where 
that person was a connected person, as defined, in relation to the trust (a concept discussed in 
detail below). 
Alternatively, and in order to spread the net wider, the section was also triggered where the 
loan, advance or credit had been advanced by any person that was a connected person in 
relation to the natural person or company mentioned above. In other words, it was sufficient 
 
139 Section 7C was enacted in terms of section 12(1) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 15 of 2016. 
140 Section 12(1) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 15 of 2016. 
141 This in terms of section 7C(2). 
142 Section 7C(3). 
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for the person advancing the loan, advance or credit to be a connected person in respect of a 
person or company that was a connected person vis-à-vis the trust.  
The first iteration of Section 7C (1) also provided that the advance in question could be either 
directly or indirectly made to the trust which, to the extent that such wording was still necessary 
having regard to the connected persons matrix described above, suggested that the interposition 
of an intermediary would not have served to exclude the operation of the section.  
Having set out the class of persons to which the section applies, sub-section (3) prescribed the 
type of transaction that had to be present in order to trigger liability under section 7C. Two 
types of transactions were identified, namely, loan, advance or credit transactions which attract 
no interest and, loan, advance or credit transactions which attract interest at a rate lower than 
the official rate of interest as defined in paragraph 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Act.143  
It is clear from a reading of the first iteration of section 7C that the meaning of “connected 
person” is crucial to the application of the section as it was only a loan advanced by a person 
or company that is a connected person vis-à-vis the trust (or by a person who is a connected 
person to the said person or trust) in question that would be susceptible to tax liability in terms 
of the section. 
Section 1 of the Act defines connected person in the following terms: 
'connected person' means- 
 
(a)in relation to a natural person- 
(i) any relative; and 
(ii) any trust (other than a portfolio of a collective investment scheme) of which such 
natural person or such relative is a beneficiary; 
(b) in relation to a trust (other than a portfolio of a collective investment scheme)- 
(i) any beneficiary of such trust; and 
(ii) any connected person in relation to such beneficiary; 
 
143 Which reads as follows: 'official rate of interest' means- 
(a) in the case of a debt which is denominated in the currency of the Republic, a rate of interest equal to 
the South African repurchase rate plus 100 basis points; or 
(b) in the case of a debt which is denominated in any other currency, a rate of interest that is the equivalent 
of the South African repurchase rate applicable in that currency plus 100 basis points: 
Provided that where a new repurchase rate or equivalent rate is determined, the new rate of interest applies for 
the purposes of this definition from the first day of the month following the date on which that new repurchase 
rate or equivalent rate came into operation 
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(bA) in relation to a connected person in relation to a trust (other than a portfolio of a collective 
investment scheme), any other person who is a connected person in relation to such trust; 
(c) in relation to a member of any partnership or foreign partnership- 
(i) any other member; and 
(ii) any connected person in relation to any member of such partnership or foreign 
partnership; 
(d) in relation to a company- 
(i) any other company that would be part of the same group of companies as that 
company if the expression 'at least 70 per cent of the equity shares in' in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of 'group of companies' in this section were 
replaced by the expression 'more than 50 per cent of the equity shares or voting rights 
in'; 
(ii) and (iii) ......deleted 
(iv) any person, other than a company as defined in section 1 of the Companies Act 
that individually or jointly with any connected person in relation to that person, holds, 
directly or indirectly, at least 20 per cent of- 
(aa) the equity shares in the company; or 
(bb) the voting rights in the company; 
(v) any other company if at least 20 per cent of the equity shares or voting rights in the 
company are held by that other company, and no holder of shares holds the majority 
voting rights in the company; 
(vA) any other company if such other company is managed or controlled by- 
(aa) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to such 
company; or 
(bb) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to a person 
contemplated in item (aa); and 
(vi) where such company is a close corporation- 
(aa) any member; 
(bb) any relative of such member or any trust (other than a portfolio of a 
collective investment scheme) which is a connected person in relation to such 
member; and 
(cc) any other close corporation or company which is a connected person in 
relation to- 
(i) any member contemplated in item (aa); or 
(ii) the relative or trust contemplated in item (bb); and 
(e) in relation to any person who is a connected person in relation to any other person in terms 
of the foregoing provisions of this definition, such other person: 
Provided that for the purposes of this definition, a company includes a portfolio of a collective 
investment scheme in securities 
          
For purposes of the company referred to in section 7C(1)(b), therefore, the person at whose 
instance the loan, advance or credit was advanced by the company must individually, or jointly 
with any person who is a person connected to them, have held no less than 20 percent of either 
the equity shares or the voting rights in the company advancing the loan, advance or credit.144  
It should be noted that in the case of NST Ferrochrome (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue (“NST”)145 the Supreme Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the meaning of the 
 
144 Paragraph (d)(iv) of the definition of connected person. 
145 2000 (3) SA 1040 (SCA).  
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words “any person” in sub-paragraph (d)(iv) of the definition of connected person. At the time 
that NST was decided the word ‘person’ was defined146 in section 1 of the Act to “[include] the 
estate of a deceased person and any trust”.  
In this regard the Court held,147 presumably with reference to the word “include(s)”, that the 
meaning of ‘person’ was not limited to a deceased estate or a trust but had a wider meaning. In 
order to determine what that wider meaning might encompass the Court had regard148 to the 
definition of ‘person’ contained in section 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, which 
provides: 
Definitions 
 
The following words and expressions shall, unless the context otherwise requires or unless 
in the case of any law it is otherwise provided therein, have the meanings hereby assigned to 
them respectively, namely- 
 
… 
 
‘person’ includes- 
(a) any divisional council, municipal council, village management board, or like authority; 
(b) any company incorporated or registered as such under any law; 
(c) any body of persons corporate or unincorporate 
          (emphasis added) 
With reference to sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of the definition of ‘person’ contained in the 
Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 the Court concluded that the words “any person” in subparagraph 
(d)(iv) of the definition of connected person in the Income Tax Act are to be construed as 
including a company unless the context indicates to the contrary.149 The definition of connected 
person therefore comprehends of both natural persons and juristic persons.  
 
146 The definition of ‘person’ presently contained in section 1 of the Act reads as follows: 
'person' includes- 
(a) an insolvent estate; 
(b) the estate of a deceased person; 
(c) any trust; and 
(d) any portfolio of a collective investment scheme, 
but does not include a foreign partnership.  
147 Ibid at para [8].  
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid.  
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The definition of what or whom constitutes a connected person was thus cast in wide terms,150 
which rendered the interposition of another person or entity in order to avoid the application of 
section 7C very difficult.  
With regard to the langue used in the first iteration of section 7C(1) in particular it is submitted 
that while the words “that person” contained in sub-section 1(b) are used to refer to the natural 
person contemplated in section 7C(1)(a), whereas the words “any person” used at the end of 
the last phrase of section 7C(1) extend to the full definition of ‘person’ including companies, 
insolvent estates, deceased estates, trusts and portfolios of collective investment schemes but 
excludes partnerships.151 
C THE EFFECT OF THE FIRST ITERATION OF SECTION 7C  
In an article titled “Loans To Trusts: Certain Aspects Of Section 7C”152 Emslie examines the 
application of the first iteration of section 7C with reference to a hypothetical scenario often 
encountered in practice, namely, the position of a family trust and the arrangements made in 
relation thereto pursuant to the conclusion of divorce proceedings between two of the 
beneficiaries/trustees.  
Emslie postulates the following set of facts; H and W were previously married in community 
of property and were both trustees and beneficiaries of the H&W Family trust. Subsequent to 
their divorce in 2010 H took the following steps in terms of the divorce settlement; he resigned 
as a trustee and beneficiary, ceded all his past and future loan claims to W and advanced R3 
million to the trust on loan account. In addition to the advance of R3 million, which was made 
pursuant to the divorce settlement, H had also previously advanced loans totalling R2 million 
to the trust during the subsistence of his marriage to W. 153  
 
150 See further in this regard SARS Interpretation Note 67 (Issue 2).  
151 Note 12 supra.  
152 Emslie T “Loans To Trusts: Certain Aspects Of Section 7C” The Taxpayer (2017) Vol 66 No 3 at page 42.  
153 Ibid at page 43.  
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Subsequent to the divorce, and in 2014, W also advanced a loan to the trust in the amount of 
R4 million. None of the loan accounts were repaid to W until the trust took out short term 
finance and repaid R 5 million to her during February 2017.  
Emslie argues that the proper application of the first iteration of section 7C to the above 
scenario should result in the following fiscal consequences:154 
i. The loans advanced during the subsistence of the marriage should be deemed to 
have been advanced by both H and W in equal portions on account of the fact that 
they had a joint estate at the time that the loans were made; 
ii. As both H and W were connected persons vis-à-vis the trust when these loans 
were advanced section 7C could potentially apply to the loans of R1 million 
provided to the trust by each party (being the loans totalling R2 million that had 
been advanced by H during the subsistence of the marriage now split equally 
between the parties on account of the joint estate); 
iii. H cannot, however, have any tax liability under section 7C as he was no longer a 
connected person when the section came into force, this by virtue of the fact that 
he was no longer a beneficiary of the trust or a relative of W on 1 March 2017;  
iv. H would in any event not have been exposed to liability under section 7C if regard 
is had to the wording of section 12(1) of the Tax Laws Amendment Act, 15 of 
2016 in terms of which section 7C was enacted. The relevant portion of the said 
section reads as follows (with emphasis provided): 
“Subsection (1) comes into operation on 1 March 2017 and applies in 
respect of any amount owed by a trust in respect of a loan, advance or 
credit provided to that trust before, on or after that date.” 
 
154 Ibid. 
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v. Emslie reasons that it is implicit in the wording of the above section that the 
amount which must be owed by a trust in order for section 7C to apply, must be 
owed to the natural person contemplated in section 7C(1)(a) (i.e. the natural 
person who provided the loan to the trust in the first place); 
vi. It would be absurd if section 7C were to be read to impose donations tax liability 
on a party in the position of H who is no longer a connected person in relation to 
either the trust or the loan and who is thus unable to charge interest, waive or 
require repayment of the loan; 
vii. A proper reading of section 7C would require that the amount owed by the trust 
be owed by the natural person who actually provided the loan, advance or credit 
to the trust; 
viii. H could for the same reason not be assessed to tax under section 7C in relation to 
the amount of R3 million advanced by him to the trust pursuant to the divorce 
settlement; 
ix. Following this line of argument W can similarly not be taxed under section 7C 
with reference to the R1 million loan advanced to the trust by H during the 
subsistence of their marriage despite the fact that the relevant loan claim has been 
ceded to her due to the fact that she was not the person who advanced the loan to 
the trust in the first place. 
Whilst this interpretation of the application of section 7C could have been supported under the 
wording of the first iteration thereof, it is submitted that the reasoning employed in Emslie’s 
example is no longer applicable by virtue of further amendments that were made to section 7C 
pursuant to avoidance schemes implemented by taxpayers in response to the first iteration 
thereof.  
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D AVOIDING THE FIRST ITERATION OF SECTION 7C  
In the form of its first iteration, Section 7C applied only to any loan, advance or credit directly 
or indirectly provided to a trust. Shortly after the section came into effect Treasury identified 
structures put in place by taxpayers in order to avoid the deemed annual donation contemplated 
in section 7C (3). This gave rise to legislative amendments to section 7C which were first tabled 
in the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2017.155 
The first avoidance strategy identified in the Explanatory Memorandum published by Treasury 
in relation to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2017 (“the 2017 Explanatory 
Memorandum”), relates to the fact that Section 7C pertains to loans provided to trusts, and only 
trusts.156 
In this regard taxpayers interposed companies to which interest free or low interest loans were 
then advanced in circumstances where the trust in question owned the shares of the borrowing 
company. As the first iteration of section 7C only provided for loans made to trusts, this type 
of structuring resulted in the anti-avoidance mechanism contained in section 7C itself being 
avoided.  
The second avoidance strategy identified in the 2017 Explanatory Memorandum concerned the 
situation where a natural person, as contemplated in section 7C(1)(a), advances a loan, advance 
or credit to the trust in question but later concludes an agreement in terms of which such person 
cedes or otherwise transfers his or her loan account to another person. As the first iteration of 
section 7C was only triggered in relation to a natural person who “provides” the loan to the 
trust, the cedent of the loan account would fall outside the scope of the section and thereby 
escape liability as the link between the person who advanced the loan and the loan itself was 
said to have been broken. 
 
 
155 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2017 at para 1.3. 
156 Ibid at page 9.  
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E SECTION 7C IN ITS CURRENT FORM 
Section 7C has been amended on two further occasions. Firstly, On 19 July 2017 the Draft 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2017 was published. In response to the avoidance strategies 
discussed above, the following amendments to section 7C were, amongst others, included to 
“refine” the provision: 
i. The replacement of section 7C (1) by the following: 
(1) This section applies in respect of any loan, advance or credit that—  
(a) a natural person; or  
(b) at the instance of that person, a company in relation to which that 
person is a connected person in terms of paragraph (d)(iv) of the definition 
of connected person, directly or indirectly provides to—  
(i) a trust in relation to which— 
(aa) that person or company, or 
(bb) any person that is a connected person in relation to the 
person or company referred to in item (aa), is a connected 
person; or  
(ii) a company that is a connected person in relation to the trust 
referred to in subparagraph (i). 
          (emphasis added) 
  and; 
ii. he insertion of the following as section 7C(1A): 
(1A) If a natural person acquires a claim to an amount owing by a trust or a 
company in respect of a loan, advance or credit referred to in subsection (1), that 
person must for purposes of this section be treated as having provided a loan, 
advance or credit to that trust or company—  
(a) on the date on which that person acquired that claim; or 
(b) if that person was not a connected person on that date in relation 
to— 
(i) that trust; or  
(ii) the person who provided that loan, advance or credit to 
that  trust or company,  
on the date on which that person became a connected person 
in relation to that trust or person, 
 that is equal to the amount of the claim so acquired. 
 
 
The Bill was enacted as the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 17 of 2017 and came into force 
on 18 December 2017. Importantly, however, the amendments to section 7C are deemed to 
have come into operation on 19 July 2017 (i.e. the date of publication of the Bill).  
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The abovementioned refinement of section 7C effectively serves to address the two avoidance 
schemes discussed under the previous section. The amendment of sub-section (1) deals with 
the interposition of a company as recipient of the loan in question by bringing a loan advanced 
to a company that is a connected person to the trust within the ambit of the taxing provision of 
section 7C.  
The scheme whereby the connection between the person who advanced the loan was “broken” 
by a cession is dealt with by the new sub-section (1A), which provides that where a person 
acquires a claim to an amount owing by a trust or company, that person must be ‘treated’ as 
having provided the loan in question on the date on which he or she acquired the claim, 
alternatively, if the person was not a connected person when the claim was acquired then he/she 
is treated as having advanced the loan in question from the date on which he/she becomes a 
connected person.  
Secondly, subsection (1)(b)(ii) – being the provision that deals with the interposition of a 
company as discussed above – was substituted by section 9(1) of the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act, 23 of 2018, again with a deemed effective date of 19 July 2017, and presently 
reads as follows: 
  (ii) a company if at least 20 per cent of –  
(aa) the equity shares in that company are held, directly or indirectly; or 
(bb) the voting rights in that company can be exercised, 
by a trust referred to in sub-paragraph (i) whether alone or together with any person 
who is a beneficiary of that trust or the spouse of a beneficiary of that trust or any 
person related to that beneficiary or that spouse within the second degree of 
consanguinity. 
 
The second and final amendment, as set out above, thus simply provides more detail than the 
first version thereof by expressly stipulating when the interposition of a company will not assist 
the taxpayer in avoiding the ambit of section 7C. 
The effect of these refinements to section 7C is that the provision in its present form is deemed 
to have come into operation on 19 July 2017 and applies to any amount owed by a trust or 
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company in respect of a loan, advance or credit provided to that trust or company before, on or 
after 19 July 2017. 
It is submitted that even in terms of the first iteration thereof, section 7C altered the legal effect 
of past taxpayer conduct. This is by virtue of the fact that any arrangement made prior to the 
promulgation of section 7C (whether the first or subsequent iterations thereof) would not have 
been subjected to donations tax and taxpayers would therefore, on the advice of their 
consultants, legitimately and legally have arranged their tax affairs in such a manner as to pay 
as little tax as possible.  
It is trite that taxpayers are entitled to avoid paying tax by structuring their affairs to attract the 
least possible tax, this principle was most recently confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS [2019] 1 All SA 106 (SCA) which is merely the latest 
pronouncement on a principle the root of which may be traced to the decision of the House of 
Lords in IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1 (HL).157 
Taxpayers who took advise and structured their affairs according to the prevailing laws are 
likely to react with outrage when informed that a subsequent law has altered the consequences 
of their past decisions and imposes a new donations tax of 20% thereon from the date that 
section 7C came into force.  
The fact that section 7C does not seek to impose donations tax from the historical date on which 
the loan, advance or credit in question was actually advanced, but only from the date that the 
section came into force, is likely to be cold comfort to taxpayers.  
The effect that section 7C has on past conduct evokes, perhaps understandably, strong feelings 
of inequity amongst taxpayer who cite, inter alia, certainty, being a fundamental tenant of the 
rule of law, as an argument against the legitimacy of legislative provisions of this nature. These 
argument will be discussed in more detail in the next section, which considers the nature of the 
 
157 An adopted into South African law by cases such as Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1996 (3) SA 942 (A) and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) 
Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA).  
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retrospective effect of section 7C with a view to determining whether or not the section may 
be successfully attacked on this basis.  
F THE VALIDITY OF RETROSPECTIVE FISCAL LEGISLATION 
South African common law distinguishes between ‘true’ retrospectivity, being the situation 
where an Act provides that a new law shall be deemed to have been in operation from a past 
date, and ‘weak’ retrospectivity in terms of which a new statute or new legislative amendment 
interferes with or is applicable to existing rights.158  
Although neither type of retrospectivity is precluded outright, true retrospectivity will only be 
allowed in circumstances where the legislature clearly intended the statute or amendment in 
question to take away or impair a vested right previously acquired under contemporaneously 
prevailing laws.159 There is a rule of interpretation to the effect that, unless such legislative 
intention is clearly evident form the wording of the provision in question, the legislation shall 
be presumed not to have true retrospective effect.160 
The validity of retrospective fiscal legislation was considered by the High Court in the recent 
case of Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service (“Pienaar 
Brothers”)161 which is discussed in detail under the next sub-section.  
F 1 PIENAAR BROTHERS (PTY) LTD v COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE & ANOTHER 
The facts in Pienaar Brothers were as follows. Serurubele Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd (“the 
taxpayer”), entered into an amalgamation transaction as contemplated in section 44 of the Act 
in terms of which it acquired all the assets of Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd on 16 March 2007, 
 
158 Unitrans Passenger (Pty) Ltd t/a Greyhound Coach Lines v Chairman, National Transport Commission and 
Others 1999 (4) SA 1 (SCA).  
159 This rule of interpretation may require amendment to bring it in line with the modern contextual approach to 
statutory interpretation as expounded in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) 
SA 593 (SCA).  
160 See for example Peterson v Cuthbert and Co Ltd 1945 AD 420 and Baartman v Dempers 1952 (2) SA 577 
(A).  
161 2017 (6) SA 435 (GP). 
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with the acquisition having effect from 1 March 2007 in terms of the agreement concluded 
between the parties. 
The business to be formed by the amalgamation required the buy-in of a BEE equity partner 
and the taxpayer procured advice from its attorneys regarding the implementation of such a 
transaction.162 
The resulting transaction envisaged inter alia the following:163 
i. The existence of Pienaar Brothers (being the amalgamated company) would need 
to be terminated in order to benefit from the provisions of section 44 of the Act. 
For this reason, Pienaar Brothers distributed its shares to its shareholders, pro 
rata to their shareholding, and was then liquidated; 
ii. The taxpayer then became the owner of the business and its directors resolved to 
make a distribution of R29 500 000 to shareholders, again pro rata to their 
shareholding, out of the taxpayer’s share premium account (“the distribution”), 
the distribution was effected on 3 May 2007; 
iii. In order to introduce the BEE partner, the taxpayer’s existing shareholders sold 
25.1% of the taxpayer’s issued share capital to Naha Properties (Pty) Ltd 
(“Naha”); 
iv. The transfer of shares to Naha was confirmed by the taxpayer’s directors on 7 
May 2007; 
v. When the taxpayer resolved to make the distribution, and at the time that the 
distribution was effected and finalised, it did not amount to a ‘dividend’ for 
purposes of the imposition of Secondary Tax on Companies (“STC”) under the 
 
162 Pienaar Brothers at para [7]. 
163 Ibid.  
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Act. This was, inter alia, on account of an exemption contained in the definition 
of ‘dividend’ in section 1 of the Act; 
vi. It was common cause that, but for the aforesaid exemption, the distribution would 
have attracted liability for STC which would have obliged the taxpayer to file an 
STC return by 30 June 2007 (a month after the distribution); 
Notwithstanding the above, the distribution was assessed to STC on strength of a retrospective 
amendment to section 44 of the Act that entailed the insertion of section 44(9A) which made 
distributions in amalgamation transactions under section 44 of the Act susceptible to STC by 
removing it from the ambit of any exemption.164 
The Explanatory Memorandum pertaining to the abovementioned legislative amendment (“the 
amendment”) stated, inter alia, the following:165 
As a theoretical matter, section 44 amalgamations should act as a deferral 
mechanism. All assets and tax attributes would roll over from the target 
company to the acquiring company with the acquiring company subsequently 
bearing these tax benefits and burdens. This same theory holds for the 
Secondary Tax on Companies (STC). The distribution of acquiring company 
shares in an amalgamation is accordingly free of STC. The distribution of 
acquiring company shares in an amalgamation is accordingly free from STC. 
However, the profits of the target company do not roll over to the acquiring 
company. The net result is often a complete STC exemption when the acquiring 
company makes a distribution of former target company assets. 
It has come to Government’s attention that certain private stakeholders are 
attempting avoidance transactions that are specifically aimed at exploiting this 
gap. In these transactions, a pre-existing target company with substantial assets 
and profits is amalgamated into a newly formed company without any assets or 
profits. The newly formed company then distributes the former target company 
 
164 Id at para [10]. 
165 Id at para [11]. 
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assets, but this distribution is free from STC due to the lack of profits within the 
newly formed acquiring company. 
From the above anomaly, the proposed amendment inserts section 44(9A) 
which deems resultant company equity share capital (and share premium) 
arising from the amalgamation to be profits not of a capital nature available 
for distribution to shareholders to the extent of any profits distributed by the 
amalgamated company in terms of sub-section (9). The result is that the 
amalgamated company’s profits are effectively rolled over to the resultant 
company, so that STC remains payable when the resultant company makes a 
subsequent distribution. 
Prior to the promulgation of the amendment, the following actions were taken to alert the public 
to the impending amendment:166 
i. In his budget speech delivered on 20 February 2007, the Minister of Finance 
referred, in general terms, to an intention to pass retrospective legislation to deal 
with certain anti-avoidance schemes pertaining to STC;  
ii. SARS issued a press release on 21 February 2007 stating that the STC exemption 
for amalgamation transactions had been withdrawn; 
iii. On 27 February 2007, the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2007 was 
released for public comment, as foreshadowed in the abovementioned press 
release, the Bill proposed the amendment of section 44 by deleting sub-sections 
(9) and (10) thereof, which amendments would be deemed to have come into 
operation on 21 February 2007 and would apply in respect of any disposal of an 
equity share, or any deemed declaration of a dividend, by an amalgamated 
company (i.e. Pienaar Brothers) on or after that date; 
 
166 Ibid. 
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iv. The Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2007 was published on 7 June 2007 
together with an Explanatory Memorandum. The Bill no longer envisaged the 
deletion of the sub-sections (9) and (10) of section 44 but rather proposed the 
insertion of section 44(9A), which amendment would be retrospective to 21 
February 2007. 
Pienaar Brothers alleged that the release of the Bill on 7 June 2007 was the first time that it 
had received warning of the fact that an amendment to the Act would affect its STC liability. 
The Bill was promulgated as Act 8 of 2007 (“the Amending Act”) without any further changes 
being made thereto.167 
Pienaar Brothers argued that, at no stage prior to the coming into force of the amendment, did 
it received any indication or warning via any communication from SARS or the Minister of 
Finance to draw its attention to the fact that it would be exposed to STC liability whether with 
retrospective effect or otherwise. 168 
The taxpayer therefore approached the High Court (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) on motion 
seeking an order declaring section 34(2) of the Amending Act to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and thus invalid. Alternatively, an order was sought in the following terms: 
i. Declaring that the provisions of section 44(9A) of the Act did not apply to the 
distribution on 3 May 2007 in the amount of R29 500 000; 
ii. Declaring that the assessment to STC on 13 December 2011 was invalid;  
iii. To the extent necessary, setting aside the STC assessment; and 
iv. Referring the order to the Constitutional Court for confirmation. 
 
167 Pienaar Brothers at para [11]. 
168 Ibid.  
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It was common cause that the transaction in question had been completed prior to the 
commencement of the Amending Act and that no liability to STC had arisen 
contemporaneously. 
In support of the relief sought, the following arguments were made on behalf of Pienaar 
Brothers: 169 
i. The main complaint related to the constitutionality of the retrospective 
amendment and was to the effect that such retrospective legislation, “which ex 
post facto deems the law at a particular time to be what it was not”, infringed on 
the principle of legality and the rule of law, both of which are central to our 
constitutional order. The prejudice which the taxpayer stands to suffer under such 
legislation is augmented where, as in the present case, it results in adverse 
consequences to completed transactions in relation to which individuals have 
acquired vested rights prior to the coming into force of the retrospective 
amendments (“the constitutional argument”); and  
ii. Even if the retrospective amendment was not unconstitutional per se, Pienaar 
Brothers argued that the amendment did not apply to the distribution either by 
virtue of the fact that that transaction had already been completed when the 
amendment came into force, or because it was not possible to apply section 
44(9A) (being the amendment which was inserted) fairly and practically in the 
context of the Act as a whole (“the interpretation argument”). 
Mr Justice Fabricius held that, since the interpretation argument, if successful, would be 
dispositive of the constitutional argument, the judgment would start by dealing with the former.  
The court noted that, at common law, a distinction existed between retrospectivity of legislation 
in the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ senses. A provision with only prospective effects on the future of 
pre-existing transactions was said to be weakly retrospective while a provision would be 
 
169 Pienaar Brothers at para [14]. 
 21 
‘strong’ if it is deemed to have been in force from a date prior to that on which it factually came 
into force.170 
Pienaar Brothers contended that the amendment in question constituted retrospectivity in the 
strong sense as the Amending Act provided that the new section 44(9A) was deemed to have 
been in force since 21 February 2007 despite the fact that the Amending Act was promulgated 
on 8 August 2007. 
According to Pienaar Brothers the Amending Act had to be interpreted in terms of the usual 
principles in order to determine whether the insertion of section 44(9A) had actual retroactive 
effect so as to expose the distribution to STC liability.  
With regard to the interpretation of legislation having possible strong retrospective effect, 
reliance was placed on several cases as authority inter alia for the following propositions: 
i. No statute is to be construed as having retrospective operation (in the sense of 
taking away or impairing a vested right acquired under existing laws) unless the 
legislature clearly intended the statute to have that effect (National Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Carolus 2000 (1) SA 1127 (SCA)); 
ii. Not only is there a presumption against retrospective activity, but even where a 
statutory provision is expressly stated to be retrospective in its operation it is an 
accepted rule that, in the absence of a contrary intention appearing from the 
statute, it is not treated as affecting completed transactions (Bellairs v Hodnett 
and Another 1978 (1) SA 1109 (A)); 
iii. It was stated in Carolus that the basis of this presumption was founded on 
elementary considerations of fairness which dictate that individuals should have 
an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; 
 
170 Pienaar Brothers at para [16]. 
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iv. Generally, there is a strong presumption that a legislature does not intend to 
impose a new liability in respect of something that has already happened, because 
generally it would not be reasonable for a legislature to do that (from the decision 
of the House of Lords in Sunshine Porcelain Potteries (Pty) Ltd v Nash [1961] 
AC 927 which was cited with approval in Du Toit v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2009 (1) SA 176 (SCA)); 
In Carolus the court referred to the position in English Law and to the decision of the House 
of Lords in L’Office Cherifien Des Phosphates and Another v Yamachita-Shinnihon Steamship 
Company Ltd: The Boucraa [1994] 1 All ER 20 (“The Boucraa”). In the Boucraa, Lord 
Musthill referred with approval to the following ratio of Staughton LJ in Secretary of State for 
Social Security and Another v Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All ER 712 (CA): 
In my judgment the true principle is that Parliament is presumed not to have 
intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner 
which is unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears. 
It is not simply a question of classifying an enactment as retrospective or not 
retrospective. Rather it may be a matter of degree – the greater the unfairness, 
the more it is to be expected that Parliament will make clear if that is intended. 
On this basis, Lord Musthill made the following statement in the Boucraa: 
Precisely how the single question of fairness will be answered in respect of a 
particular statute will depend on the interaction of several factors, each of them 
capable of varying from case to case. Thus, the degree to which the statute has 
retrospective effect is not a constant. Nor is the value of the rights which the 
statute effects, or the extent to which the value is diminished or extinguished by 
the retrospective effect of the statute. Again, the unfairness of adversely 
affecting the rights, and hence the degree of unlikelihood that this is what 
Parliament intended, will vary from case to case. So also will the clarity of the 
language used by Parliament, in the light shed on it by consideration of the 
circumstances in which the legislation was enacted. All these factors must be 
weighed together to provide a direct answer to the question whether the 
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consequences of reading the statute with the suggested degree of retrospectivity 
are so unfair that the words used by Parliament cannot have been intended to 
mean what they might appear to say.  
It was submitted on behalf of Pienaar Brothers, having regard to the abovementioned 
principles and the contextual approach to statutory interpretation brought about by the 
judgment in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 
(SCA), that while the Amending Act expressly made section 44(9A) retrospective to 21 
February 2007, it does not expressly state that it should apply to completed transactions.171  
As it was common cause that the transaction in question which led to the distribution was 
completed prior to the promulgation of the Amending Act, Pienaar Brothers argued that the 
presumptions referred to in the authorities above conduced to justify an interpretation of the 
Amending Act to the effect that it does not apply to a completed transaction such as the 
distribution.172  
As an addition to the above argument, it was furthermore submitted that courts should pay 
particular close attention to the practical impact that purported retrospectivity will have on the 
relevant legislative framework in its entirety. This argument was to the effect that the 
legislature was ‘most unlikely’ to have intended the retrospective consequences where the 
provisions in question omit to provide for the machinery necessary for a taxpayer to comply 
with the retrospective effect thereof. In other words, where a retrospective provision, for 
example, requires that a return should have been submitted and payment thereon made in the 
past, that provision should stipulate how such actions should be performed if presently 
triggered by the retrospective application of the legislation in question.173 
Should the Amending Act have retrospective effect as contended for by SARS, Pienaar 
Brothers argued that the taxpayer would immediately upon the coming into force thereof be in 
 
171 Pienaar Brothers at para [19]. 
172 Ibid.  
173 Ibid. 
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default of a statutory obligation to pay STC by 30 June 2007 (i.e. one month after the 
distribution) and therefor be guilty of the criminal offence of failure to submit a return.  
It was submitted that the legislature could not have intended these ‘unfair and anomalous’ 
results, and that these considerations bolstered the argument that section 44(9A) was not 
intended to apply to completed transactions retrospectively. 
By contrast, SARS argued that the Amending Act was promulgated after sufficient public 
notice had been given (in the forms already described above), and in fact constituted a less 
drastic amendment than the deletion of the exemption contained in section 49(9), which less 
drastic course of action was facilitated by representations made in response to the Draft Bill.174 
The relevant section of the Amending Act read as follows: 
1(c) shall be deemed to have come into operation on 21 February 2007 and 
applies to any reduction or redemption of the share capital or the share 
premium of a resultant company including the acquisition by that company of 
its shares in terms of section 85 of the Companies Act 1973 on or after that date.
               (emphasis provided.) 
With regard to the above provision of the Amending Act, the learned judge stated, “In my view 
this section is clear, and it applies to ‘any reduction’…On applicant’s argument it must be read 
to mean that it does not apply to a completed transaction”. This judicial statement tucked into 
the summary of arguments made on behalf of SARS signalled the first death knell for the 
taxpayer’s case.175 
Predictably, it was submitted on behalf of SARS that the relevant sections of the Amending 
Act were clear, unambiguous and indicated expressly that the Act applied to completed 
transaction.176  
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As for Pienaar Brothers’ argument regarding the lack of ‘machinery’ to comply with the 
relevant obligations to file returns and pay tax retrospectively, SARS submitted that the 
‘obvious answer’ was to interpret the amendment to mean that a taxpayer’s duty in this regard 
only arose on 8 August 2007 when the amendment came into force.  
Ultimately, SARS’s submissions relied heavily on the refrain that the Amending Act had been 
promulgated in order to close a loophole that taxpayers, such as the one in question, had 
exploited in order to avoid liability to STC. The imperative to close the loophole was informed 
by the following considerations:177 
i. It was unfair to taxpayers and the public at large that certain taxpayers could 
exploit the loophole and avoid paying STC; 
ii. The effective collection of revenue is essential to the provision of services to 
ordinary South Africans. It was said in Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service and Another 2001 (1) SA 1109 (CC) that the fiscus 
plays a vital role in the public interest of collecting taxes for the economic 
wellbeing of the nation as a whole; 
iii. The amendment did not place amalgamating companies such as the taxpayer in 
any worse position than other companies or treat them unfairly. It simply served 
to ensure that they, like all other companies, pay STC on the distribution of 
income to their shareholders. 
Mr Justice Fabricius agreed with the arguments advanced on behalf of SARS and therefore 
decided the interpretation argument in its favour on the basis that the amendment was clear, its 
purpose was rational, and it applied to all transactions including those that were complete prior 
to the commencement of the Amending Act. As Pienaar Brothers had lost the interpretation 
argument, the learned judge proceeded to consider the constitutional argument.178 
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Pienaar Brothers’ argument with regard to the application of the Constitution was that the 
Amending Act was invalid on the basis that it was, to the extent that it applied retrospectively, 
inconsistent with the rule of law, being a foundational constitutional value.179 
The constitutional argument was fortified by the allegations that:180 
i. The taxpayer had been made subject to a retroactive tax assessment resulting in a 
substantial STC liability for which it had not been prepared; 
ii. Any other taxpayer, all things being equal, would have suffered the same 
prejudice, which was inherent in the liability to pay a tax which was not payable 
contemporaneously with the completed transaction; and 
iii. Pienaar Brothers’ shareholders and its BEE partners also suffered prejudice as 
the former’s net asset value had been determined without taking the significant 
STC liability into account. 
Pienaar Brothers accepted that the rule of law does not preclude retrospective legislation 
altogether, but conceded only a narrow exception, namely ‘when there was adequate warning 
of the intention to implement the change retrospectively.’ As, on its version, adequate notice 
had not been provided of the terms of the Amending Act, Pienaar Brothers contended that the 
retrospective enactment in question offended the rule of law and was therefore invalid.181  
More particularly, Pienaar Brothers’ argument was to the effect that retrospective tax 
legislation is presumptively unconstitutional, and in the absence of proper warning to 
taxpayers, a retroactive amendment can never pass constitutional muster.182  
With regard to the rule of law and what qualities it demands, it was submitted that the prime 
feature of a system subject to the rule of law is certainty. Only with certainty may citizens be 
 
179 Id at para [39]. 
180 Id at para [40]. 
181 Id at para [69]. 
182 Id at para [72]. 
 27 
aware of their rights and predict the legal consequences of their actions; the rule of law is thus 
said to postulate, inter alia, that laws should not be applied retrospectively to the disadvantage 
of individuals as such retrospectivity deprives the individual of a fair chance at ‘knowing and 
predicting his rights and of knowing how to regulate his conduct unless he be remarkably 
prescient…’183 
The rule of law is expressly incorporated into our constitutional disposition by virtue of section 
1 (c) of the Constitution which states that ‘supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law’ 
is a founding value of Constitutionalism in this country. The first consequence of constitutional 
supremacy is the fact that any law or conduct which does not comply with the Constitution is 
invalid.184 
Relying on Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 936 (CC), where it 
was held that an important principle of the rule of law is that rules be stated in a clear and 
accessible manner, it was argued on behalf of Pienaar Brothers that, for present purposes, this 
principle implied that persons subject to the law must be able to find it, understand it and 
thereby regulate their affairs accordingly.  
Similarly, as is evident inter alia from CSARS v NWK Ltd 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA), taxpayers 
are entitled to organise their affairs in order to pay as little tax as possible, avoidance (as 
opposed to evasion) being lawful.185  
Reliance was also placed on the minority judgment of Justice Mokgoro in Veldman v Director 
of Public Prosecutions: Witwatersrand Local Division 2007 (3) SA 210 (CC), where the 
learned judge concurred with American authority in holding as following:186 
Generally, legislation is not to be interpreted to extinguish existing rights and 
obligations. This is so unless the statute provides otherwise or its language 
clearly shows such a meaning. That legislation will affect only future matters 
and not take away existing rights is basic to notions of fairness and justice which 
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are integral to the rule of law, a foundational principle of our Constitution. Also 
central to the rule of law is the principle of legality which requires that law must 
be certain, clear and stable. Legislative enactments are intended to “give fair 
warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until 
expressly changed.” 
Section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution expressly prohibits retroactive legislation in the context of 
criminal law by providing that the right to a fair trial includes the right not to be convicted for 
an act or omission that was not an offence at the time that it was committed or omitted.  
Taking note of the fact that our Courts have yet to consider definitely whether retrospective 
legislative amendments may pass constitutional muster outside of criminal law, Pienaar 
Brothers argued that, in the light of the constitutional imperative described above, courts must 
vindicate the rule of law by setting aside legislation which contravenes that principle. Any 
legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution must be declared invalid.  
Counsel acting for Pienaar Brothers then referred to authorities from the United States and the 
United Kingdom for guidance.187 
As far as the United States is concerned, it was held by the Supreme Court in United States v 
Carlton 512 US 26 (1994), that retrospective amendments to fiscal legislation was 
constitutionally permissible provided that such amendments met a ‘due process test’, which is 
linked to the rationality of the legislative purpose of the amendment.  
In the United Kingdom, courts had not been called upon to adjudicate a challenge to 
retrospective legislation based on the rule of law, although the latter is certainly an accepted 
principle of English Law. With reference to the English authorities cited by Pienaar Brothers, 
Mr Justice Fabricius quoted substantially from the decision of the House of Lords in National 
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Westminster Bank Plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd and Others [2005] 4 All ER 209 where Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead made, inter alia, the following observations:188 
i. From time to time court decisions on points of law represent a change in what 
until then the law in question was generally thought to be. This happens most 
obviously when a court departs from, or an appellate court overrules, a previous 
decision on the same point of law. The point of law may concern the interpretation 
of a statue or it may relate to a principle of a ‘judge-made’ law, that is, the 
common law…A change of this nature does not always involve departing from 
or overruling a previous court decision. Sometimes the court may give a statute, 
until then free from judicial interpretation, a different meaning from that 
commonly held; 
ii. A court ruling which changes the law from what it was previously thought to be 
operates retrospectively as well as prospectively. The ruling will have a 
retrospective effect so far as the parties to a particular dispute are concerned; 
iii. People generally conduct their affairs on the basis of what they understand the 
law to be. This ‘retrospective’ effect of a change in the law of this nature can have 
disruptive and seemingly unfair consequences. ‘Prospective overruling’, 
sometimes described as ‘non-retroactive overruling’, is a judicial tool fashioned 
to mitigate these adverse consequences. It is a shorthand description for court 
rulings on points of law which, to greater or lesser extent, are designed not to 
have the normal retrospective effect of judicial decisions.  
Mr Justice Fabricius commented that the process described by Lord Nicholls is ‘almost the 
same in the South African legal system’ and referred in particular to section 172(1)(b) of the 
Constitution which gives courts the power, when making orders of constitutional invalidity, to 
limit the retrospective effect thereof.189 
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On this basis, and referring to the foreign authorities, Mr Justice Fabricius concluded that:190 
It is clear from this incisive summary that not only do certain statutes affect 
rights or vested rights retrospectively, but that decisions of courts do so in many 
cases. I am not aware of any authority, and none has been provided to me, that 
those results would mean that any such statute or decision is unconstitutional 
per se, irrespective of the reason for the adoption of the statute or the facts of a 
particular case before a court of law, and irrespective of its wording. 
Finally, on the subject of English authorities relating to retrospective fiscal legislation, Mr 
Justice Fabricius referred to the judgment in The Queen on the application of R Huitson v 
HMRC [2010] EWHC 97, where Mr Justice Kenneth Parker referred to the following general 
propositions in relation to tax laws:191 
i. In securing the payment of taxes, a national authority must strike a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights, including 
the right that a person enjoys to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions; 
ii. In framing and implementing policies in the area of taxation, the state will enjoy 
a wide margin of appreciation and the court will respect the legislature’s 
assessment in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation. The 
domestic analogue of the margin of appreciation is the discretionary area of 
judgment and is especially wide in the field of social and economic policy; 
iii. The more the subject matter of legislation concerns matters of broad social policy, 
the less ready will be a court to intervene; 
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iv. Nonetheless the court will carefully examine all the relevant circumstances 
including the history of the challenged provisions, to determine whether a fair 
balance has been struck; 
v. These principles apply to tax legislation that is retrospective; 
vi. Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not ‘as such’ prohibit 
retrospective legislation. The question to be answered is whether in the 
applicant’s specific circumstances, the retrospective application of the law 
imposed an unreasonable burden on them and thereby failed to strike a fair 
balance between the various interests involved; 
vii. The imposition of a tax is not devoid of reasonable foundation by reason only that 
it may have some retrospective effect.  
Mr Justice Fabricius noted that the ‘fair balance test’ was not the test that applies in our legal 
system but otherwise stated that he regarded these propositions as being ‘particularly 
instructive’ in the present context.192  
The learned judge next considered the application of these principles to the South African legal 
system. He stated that the ‘touchstone’ for determining the validity of retrospective legislation 
would always be the question as to whether or not the rule of law had been contravened.193  
In Robertson v City of Cape Town 2004 (5) SA 412 (C), Mr Justice Bozalek stated that 
‘retrospective legislation contravenes the rule of law where it unreasonably or unfairly impairs 
the ability of those bound by the law to regulate their conduct in accordance therewith’. Mr 
Justice Fabricius found himself unable to agree with this statement if what was suggested was 
that ‘unfair impairment’ is the appropriate test in our constitutional dispensation.194  
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In this regard the learned judge opined that there are ‘degrees of unfairness’, that not all laws 
are fair and that:  
The real question would be whether a law is ‘unjust’, ie whether it passes 
constitutional muster, ie was the law, accepting that its language is clear, 
passed for a rational reason? 
The next element of Pienaar Brothers’ constitutional argument was that the taxpayer had not 
received fair warning of the amendment contained in the Amending Act and that, such 
warnings as were received, differed materially from the amendment that was in fact enacted.195  
It was submitted that the court should adopt a rigorous approach towards infringements of the 
rule of law. As court have ‘extended themselves to the maximum’ by applying the 
presumptions against retrospective legislation, so too should they demand a very high level of 
correlation between the changes to the law of which taxpayers were notified and the actual 
legislative amendments that follow before being satisfied that taxpayers must suffer the 
consequences of the change retrospectively.196  
The learned judge rejected Pienaar Brothers’ arguments in this regard and stated that he was 
unaware of any authority that required ‘fairly precise warning’ must be given before parliament 
may proceed to enact retrospective legislative provisions, whether generally or in the context 
of fiscal legislation. On this basis Mr Justice Fabricius concluded that “if the tax statute is 
rationally connected to a legitimate purpose, no precise warning is required, if one at all”.197 
By contrast, it was contended on behalf of SARS that the Constitution does not generally 
preclude the enactment of retrospective legislation save for in the criminal context as provided 
in section 35(3)(l). On SARS’ version, the question was therefore to what extent the 
entrenchment of the rule of law inhibited or prohibited retrospective legislation.198  
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Having regard to Pienaar Brothers’ contention that the Amending Act was invalid on the basis 
that insufficient notice of its contents had been provided, SARS argued that this approach was 
untenable for the following reasons:199 
i. It is inconsistent with the approach in the foreign jurisdictions to which our courts 
have frequently looked for guidance in such matters, such as Canada, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the European Union; 
ii. It is inconsistent with the approach the Constitutional Court has laid down in 
relation to the constitutional scrutiny of legislation; and 
iii. Pienaar Brothers’ challenge fails on its own formulation of the test as sufficient 
notice was in fact provided to taxpayers before the amendment was enacted. 
SARS argued further that the use of retrospective legislation was ‘a necessary tool of modern 
government throughout the world’s leading democratic societies’ and that examples of such 
enactments existed in our own jurisdiction, namely:200 
i. Previously, the Income Tax Act proceeded from the premise that a trust was a 
person in law and therefore subject to tax. When the decision in Friedman v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1991 (2) SA 340 (W) was handed down and 
confirmed on appeal, holding as it did that a trust was not a person in law and 
therefore not subject to taxation, the consequences for the fiscus would have been 
calamitous and Parliament moved swiftly to pass legislation in terms of which 
the definition of ‘person’ in the Income Tax Act was extended to expressly 
include a trust. The amendment came into force on 1 July 1991 with retrospective 
effect from March 1986 and therefore had retrospective effect spanning in excess 
of five years; 
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ii. Where judicial pronouncements had cast doubt on the validity of a withholding 
tax levied in the erstwhile Ciskei, the Ciskei government responded by enacting 
legislation to provide specifically for the imposition of such taxes during 1993 
with retrospective effect from March 1985; 
iii. An even more drastic example was when doubt was cast on the validity of the 
Exchange Control Regulations promulgated under the Currency and Exchanges 
Act, 9 of 1933, which doubt led to Parliament amending the said legislation on 
two occasions during 1987 and 1988 with retrospective effect from 1961. These 
enactments thus had retrospective effect across 27 to 27 years respectively; 
iv. Courts have always developed the common law with retrospective effect despite 
the fact that the development in question may amount to a novel amendment to 
the common law or to the introduction of a brand-new rule.  
As far as our constitutional dispensation is concerned, SARS stressed that in terms of the 
doctrine of objective constitutional validity, an unconstitutional law is rendered invalid with 
full retrospective effect from the outset. This naturally being subject to the discretion granted 
by the provisions of section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution which allows judges to limit the 
retrospective effect of declarations of invalidity in the interests of justice.201 
SARS argued that all of the above authorities and considerations demonstrate that the ability 
to amend laws retrospectively is a common and necessary rule of modern government and 
modern jurisprudence.202  
It was contended that the aforesaid proposition was inconsistent with Pienaar Brothers’ 
argument that ‘there lurks in section 1(c) of the Constitution either a total prohibition of the 
retrospective legislation or one so constrained’ as Pienaar Brothers motivated for.203 
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Mr Fabricius next proceeded to analyse authorities submitted by SARS from the jurisdictions 
of Canada, the United States, the European Union, England and Germany. With the exception 
of Germany,204 which was the only civil law jurisdiction considered (where the doctrine of 
stare decisis is not observed), all the other jurisdictions recognised the validity of retrospective 
legislative amendments.205  
SARS argued that the position under German Law was clearly distinguishable on the basis that 
ours is a common law system and is more aligned to the jurisdictions of England, Canada and 
the United States.206  
Mr Justice Fabricius preferred, in particular, the English authorities and stated that they were 
persuasive in the absence of any apposite judgment of a South African court. The learned judge 
opined that a less strict approach than that adopted under German Law should be adopted in 
South Africa, at least in the context of tax statutes, where a rational reason appears in the 
interest of the fiscus and where a broad warning was given that a particular deficiency or 
‘loophole’ would be addressed by the authorities.207  
SARS’ argument proceeded, having established that retrospective laws are common and 
permissible in jurisdictions based on the rule of law, to consider the question as to what the 
standard is by which the constitutional validly of retrospective jurisdiction should be judged in 
South Africa.208 
Two standards for review exist in the context of determinations of constitutional validity of 
legislation in this country:209 
 
204 Id at para [79] quoting from a paper presented by the President of the German Administrative Court. The 
German Federal Constitutional Court declared any law having retroactive to be ‘in principle unconstitutional 
and impermissible’. This decision was reached on the basis of the requirements of the rule of law and the 
necessity to protect legitimate expectations.  
205 Id from para [72] – para [80]. 
206 Id at para [80]. 
207 Pienaar Brothers at para [80]. 
208 Id at para [81]. 
209 Ibid. 
 36 
i. First, the basic threshold enquiry of the ‘rationality’ test, which is the standard 
that is applied to all legislation under the rule of law pursuant to section 1(c) of 
the Constitution; and 
ii. Second, the tests of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘proportionality’ which are more 
exacting and apply when legislation limits a fundamental right in the Bill of 
Rights, in terms of section 36 (1) of the Constitution, such limitations will only 
be valid where they are found to be ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society’. 
As regards the question as to which of these standards applied to determine the validity of 
retrospective legislation, SARS argued the answer clearly depended on whether or not the 
legislation in question limits a fundamental right contained in the Bill of Rights. Where a 
fundamental right was in issue the standard would be that of ‘reasonableness’ and 
‘proportionality’, if not the rationality standard would apply.210 
Mr Justice Fabricius agreed with this exposition of the law and noted that the rationality 
standard applicable in South Africa was the same as that which applied in the United States 
and is more exacting than the standards which apply in Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
European Union. 211 
In conclusion, SARS submitted that once it was accepted that the rationality standard was 
applicable in determining the validity of the Amending Act, Pienaar Brothers’ case must 
inevitably fail as it was eminently rational for Government to move to close the loophole that 
the taxpayer was exploiting and that, in the absence of a breach of a fundamental right, the 
taxpayer’s perceived injustice was simply irrelevant.212 
As was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Law Society of South Africa and Others v 
Minister of Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC), the requirement of rationality is not 
directed at testing whether legislation is fair or reasonable or appropriate, nor is it aimed at 
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deciding whether there are other or even better means that could have been used. Its use is 
restricted to the threshold question whether the measure the lawgiver had chosen is properly 
related to the public good it seeks to realise. 213 
The sole remaining vestige of hope for Pienaar Brothers’ argument was its complaint 
regarding the inadequacy of the notice it had been given by Government regarding the content 
of the amendments to be enacted. The learned judge had effectively already rejected this 
argument and proceeded to dispose of it outright by stating the following: 
I am not aware of any provision in any of the jurisdictions that I have referred 
to, or indeed in ours, to the effect that the warnings given must related to the 
exact same amendment that is ultimately made. To adopt such an approach 
would undermine the parliamentary process and the public participation 
process completely. It would also mean that Parliament would be bound by an 
announcement made by the executive…I am therefore not of the opinion that a 
precise warning must be given in each and every case, nor that a warning, of 
whatever ambit, needs to be given in all cases. In my view, a proper approach 
would be to judge the legality of retrospective amendments on a case-by-case 
basis, having regard to the various considerations that I have referred to. The 
Constitution itself certainly does not prohibit retrospective legislation in civil 
law.  
Pienaar Brothers’ case was accordingly dismissed. 
F 2 RETROSPECTIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 7C 
It is evident from the above that the taxpayer’s visceral reaction of perceived injustice when 
confronted with retrospective legislation, although understandable, does not necessarily find 
support in the constitutional jurisprudence on this country.  
 
213 At para [35]. 
 38 
On a textual level, it is clear that both iterations of section 7C are retrospective: 
i. The retrospective effect of the first iteration of section 7C is demonstrated by the 
wording of section 12 (2) of the Amending Act which provides that section 7C 
shall come into operation on 1 March 2017 and apply in respect of any amount 
owed by a trust in respect of a loan, advance or credit provided to that trust before, 
on or after that date; and 
ii. The retrospective effect of the second iteration of section 7C is even more marked 
when regard is had to the fact that the Amending Act in question, which came 
into force on 18 December 2018, provides that the amendments to section 7C are 
deemed to have come into force on 18 July 2017 (being the date on which the 
Draft Bill was published). 
To varying degrees section 7C, in all its iterations, therefore has retrospective effect in the weak 
sense. None of its iterations constitute retrospective legislation in the strong sense, otherwise 
referred to as retroactivity, as they do not seek to assess taxpayers to tax retrospectively for the 
full historical period during which the relevant enactment is deemed to apply. Instead, section 
7C imposes only prospective liability.  
All the iterations of section 7C are, however, retrospective in the sense that they change the 
legal consequences of completed past conduct in circumstances where such conduct would 
have attracted no liability to tax pursuant to contemporaneous laws.  
The current iteration of section 7C, and in particular subsection (1A), arguably has stronger 
retrospective effect than the first iteration in the sense that it imposes taxes on individuals who 
were not involved in granting the loans in question at all, let alone in the favourable terms 
which trigger the donations tax applicable.  
The question then arises as to whether section 7C can be attacked on the basis of its 
retrospectivity, and by virtue of the perceived injustice experienced by taxpayers who are made 
subject to its provisions.  
 39 
Having regard to the judgment in Pienaar Brothers, it would appear that any attack based on 
the rule of law in relation to the retrospectivity of section 7C would not stand good prospects 
of success, at least not in circumstances where it is confined to a non-fundamental right and 
therefore subject only to threshold rationality analysis.  
It is respectfully submitted that much of the authority, both local and international, relied on in 
Pienaar Brothers related to the general retrospective effect of judgments handed down by 
courts in common law jurisdictions and that such authority is not entirely helpful in the context 
of legislative retrospectivity.  
The vast majority of judgments that have “retrospective” effect are mere pronouncements on 
what the correct legal position always was, despite the contrary understanding thereof that one 
or more of the litigants may have toiled under.214 
It is only in rare cases where judgments have been relied on for some time and are subsequently 
overturned by appellate courts where the effect of a judgment truly takes on retrospective effect 
in a manner that is similar to that of legislative retrospectivity.215 
It is, however, submitted that even under the aforesaid infrequent circumstances the 
retrospective effect of the judgment in question will not be analogous to legislative 
retrospectivity. This is because a judgment of this nature will not apply to completed 
transactions to general retroactive effect and the consequences thereof may well be excluded 
by agreement between the parties (depending on the nature of the law being pronounced upon). 
More importantly, and on a conceptual level, courts in common law jurisdictions must 
necessarily hand down judgements that have retrospective consequences in order to maintain 
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the integrity of the legal system as a whole. There is no such imperative when it comes to the 
drafting of legislation. 
As in Pienaar Brothers, section 7C was devised to close a so-called loophole in the law which 
allowed taxpayers to derive a tax benefit from structuring their affairs in a certain manner so 
as to avoid certain taxes and legitimately minimise their tax liability.  
As Emslie points out,216 the reasoning in Pienaar Brothers suggests that taxpayers “exploiting” 
such a “loophole” cannot be heard to complain when their scheme is exposed, and they are 
made to pay taxes hitherto successfully avoided.  
Emslie argues for a different categorisation of what this taxpayer behaviour amounts to. He 
suggests that applying the general scope of the Act as it stands at any given point in time cannot 
be seen as exploiting a loophole as such categorisation would fly in the face of the accepted 
principle that taxpayers are entitled to structure their affairs in a tax efficient manner. 
To the extent that the reasoning in Pienaar Brothers in fact encapsulates the sentiment that 
taxpayers who structure their affairs in such a manner cannot rely on perceived inequitable 
consequences when Parliament reacts with retrospective legislation it must, with respect, be 
rejected. 
Legislative enactments with retrospective effect may have been brought about by pressing 
policy considerations but this is not the same as the position obtaining in the context of judicial 
pronouncements having retrospective effect and should therefore not be justified on the same 
basis.  
When Parliament enacts retrospective provisions, it does so knowingly and with express 
intention, and not by virtue of the exigency that accompanies judicial pronouncements having 
retrospective effect.  
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Retrospective legislative enactments should therefore be consistent with the Constitution and 
the rule of law because, unlike the position in the United Kingdom, the South African 
Parliament is no longer supreme, and its actions must always pass constitutional muster.  
Having said that, it is difficult to see how the legitimate policy considerations which underpin 
the fiscus’ endeavours to realise taxes will fail to pass threshold rationality analysis: for the 
means of taxation will generally justify the ends of national economic wellbeing.217 
The taxpayers who will be hit by the provisions of the current iteration of section 7C will be 
deriving a benefit, for example, from the loan claims ceded to them and the ‘rationality’ of 
Treasury seeking to tax that benefit is, it is submitted, likely to be accepted by courts. 
G CONCLUSION 
There is, however, an exception to the reach of section 7C which refers back to Emslie’s 
analysis on the consequences of the first iteration of the section which is discussion under part 
C above. 
In the context of donations tax, it has been the position since the decision in Welch’s Estate v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2005 (4) SA 173 (SCA) that property 
settled on a trust pursuant to a divorce order, and so as to facilitate the fulfilment of the settlor’s 
obligations in terms of that order, will not amount to a donation attracting donations tax in 
terms of the Act (provided that the order in question provides that the obligations will revert to 
the settlor should the trust fail to fulfil them). 
This is because a donation requires pure liberality and disinterested benevolence, not self-
interest or the expectation of a quid pro quo. The settlor in the above scenario, however, does 
not possess such disinterested benevolence as he or she makes the settlement with the express 
expectation of being relieved of the obligations imposed by the divorce order.218 
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It is therefore submitted that section 7C does not apply to settlements made on trusts pursuant 
to the maintenance obligations imposed by a divorce order and will therefore have no effect on 
the cession of loan accounts in this context. 
The aforesaid conclusion is supported by a contextual interpretation of the language used in 
section 7C as well as the stated purpose with which it was enacted (as reflected in the relevant 
Explanatory Memoranda). The mischief that the anti-avoidance provisions contained in section 
7C are aimed at addressing is entirely distinct form the scenario in which loan accounts are 
ceded under the terms of a divorce order.  
More generally, despite the initial sense of injustice which often accompanies the realisation 
that fiscal consequences are imposed with retrospective effect in terms of section 7C, it is 
submitted that the imperative to tax the transfer of generational wealth, as a policy 
consideration informing the enactment of the provision, seems to be entirely rational.  
It is respectfully concluded that Mr Justice Fabricius was correct in his observation that our 
threshold rationality standard is more exacting than that which is employed in the United 
Kingdom where the test is focussed on equities and the striking of a fair balance. 
As the rationality standard is disinterested and does not concern itself with such human 
ruminations as reasonability or appropriateness, it seems that the public good that section 7C 
seeks to realise will, under the circumstances, probably be found to be properly related to the 
ambit of its provisions. 
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